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PARALLEL STATE 
Gregory Dolin† & Irina D. Manta† 
Alternatively glamorized and reviled, Rio de Janeiro’s shantytowns, known as 
“favelas,” have become a fixture of the city’s architecture and life. It is estimated that 
about 1.5 million people reside in these informal settlements that are scattered in the 
center and outskirts of Brazil’s second-largest metropolitan area. Operating in the 
shadow of the law and lacking formal ownership title, favela residents have 
constructed an intricate set of informal rules to buy, sell, rent, and bequeath property 
that is often administered by the residents’ associations of individual neighborhoods, 
which also assist in mediating related conflicts. While largely untested legal 
mechanisms may now exist in some favelas to obtain title, obstacles such as the cost 
to do so as well as ignorance of the legal system—combined with a relative reliance 
on the current informal scheme of acquisition and dispute resolution—stand in the 
way of residents’ achieving formal ownership. This Article argues that while the 
informal framework has proved fairly efficient at managing everyday life in the 
favelas, the large-scale removals that the government has implemented in Rio de 
Janeiro in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games have 
upset the balance. Due in part to individuals’ lack of legal title, the government has 
been able to apply a high degree of discretion over the conditions under which it has 
exercised its eminent domain power, including when it came to deciding which 
abodes would be taken, what level of compensation people should receive, and how 
favela residents would be relocated. This Article shows how even robust extralegal 
frameworks can lull people into a false sense of security about their rights, which 
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governments may exploit to dispossess the poor and vulnerable when it is politically 
desirable to do so. This should serve as a renewed call to simplify the titling process 
for individuals and interrogate the forces that oppose it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 Olympic Games (Games) in Rio de Janeiro were mired in 
controversy. With less than two months to go until the Games, the State 
government declared a “state of public calamity” over the financial crisis 
that plagued the region.1 The event was under potential threat by 
militant Islamists.2 The outbreak of the Zika virus, whose devastating 
effects include potential microcephaly in babies, motivated numerous 
 
 1 Donna Bowater, Rio Declares ‘State of Calamity’ amid Cash Crisis that Could Threaten 
Olympics as City Hospital Forced to Close Doors, TELEGRAPH (June 17, 2016, 11:41 PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/17/rio-declares-state-of-calamity-amid-cash-crisis-ahead-
of-olympic. 
 2 Brazil Sees Rising Threat from Isil Ahead of Rio Olympics, Intelligence Agency Says, 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 16, 2016, 1:49 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/16/brazil-
sees-rising-threat-from-isil-ahead-of-rio-olympics-intell. 
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experts to call for moving or delaying the Rio Olympics.3 It is telling that 
the problem is considered minor in comparison with some much 
higher-frequency events—a woman is ten times more likely to be raped 
than catch Zika in Rio de Janeiro, while men are more likely to be shot 
to death.4 Even the construction of the facilities themselves appeared to 
be in a state of disarray only shortly before the planned start of the 
festivities.5 
While the long-term effects of holding the Olympics in Rio de 
Janeiro will remain unknown for some time, a significant number of 
individuals have already had their lives uprooted by them. This is 
especially true of the thousands of people who were forcibly removed 
from their homes to make place for construction for both the Olympics 
and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The exact number of persons affected 
remains in contention. One report claims that at least 4120 families had 
lost their homes due to the Olympics by 2015, which may have 
engendered the effect that “thousands of children have been displaced 
and left—at least temporarily—unable to access education, healthcare 
and other social services.”6 According to government figures, a total of 
22,059 families were removed in Rio between 2009 and 2015, for a total 
of about 77,206 individuals.7 The City government claims, however, that 
only a few hundred of these families were relocated due to the Olympics, 
namely in the favela, or shantytown, of Vila Autódromo that borders the 
main Olympic Park.8 The removals in that area led to violent clashes 
between inhabitants who refused to leave and law enforcement, even 
 
 3 Agence France-Presse, Olympics in Rio Should Move Due to Zika Concerns, Say 150 
Experts, TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2016, 9:49 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/27/
olympics-in-rio-should-move-due-to-zika-concerns-say-150-experts. 
 4 Vanessa Barbara, Brazil’s Olympic Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/brazils-olympic-catastrophe.html. 
 5 See id. At one point, officials even lost the keys to the Olympic Stadium. See Daniel Tran, 
Rio Officials Lose Keys to Olympic Stadium, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 4, 2016, 4:09 AM), http://
sports.yahoo.com/news/rio-officials-lose-keys-to-olympic-stadium-080908840.html. 
 6 Jonathan Watts, Rio Olympics Linked to Widespread Human Rights Violations, Report 
Reveals, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/
08/rio-olympics-2016-human-rights-violations-report. 
 7 COMITÊ POPULAR DA COPA E OLIMPÍADAS DO RIO DE JANEIRO, MEGAEVENTOS E 
VIOLAÇÕES DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS NO RIO DE JANEIRO 20 (2015), http://
www.childrenwin.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Dossie-Comit%C3%AA-Rio2015_low.pdf. 
 8 Bruce Douglas, Brazil Officials Evict Families from Homes Ahead of 2016 Olympic Games, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/28/brazil-
officials-evicting-families-2016-olympic-games; see also RIO PREFEITURA, EXPLAINING RIO DE 
JANEIRO HABITATIONAL POLICY 3–4 (2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1x0_
cNhKxbDb094M1hraGVNekU/view?pref=2&pli=1 (arguing that the sports events-related 
removal figures are inflated). 
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though Rio’s mayor had initially promised that there would be no forced 
relocations.9 
As this Article discusses, the removals of politically powerless 
individuals to make way for construction projects for the Olympics and 
World Cup are only the latest in a long series of removals that favela 
residents have suffered. Theirs is a story that—while infused with the 
travails of South American politics—also contains the elements of 
adverse possession and eminent domain that resonate with those 
familiar with the American legal system. While favela residents have 
built a rich informal property system around their way of life to buy, 
sell, and facilitate the inheritance of their homes and businesses, this 
Article argues that their lack of individual title stands in the way of full 
legal recognition of ownership by the government. When events such as 
the Olympics or World Cup motivate the state to engage in large-scale 
architectural planning that includes the exercise of eminent domain, the 
absence of title allows the government to seize land and disburse 
compensation at its discretion. Favela residents technically now have 
legal access to adverse possession and other means to obtain title after 
having lived in the same homes for a long time, but the arcane and 
complex mechanisms to which they are forced to resort effectively 
prevent them from accomplishing this and keep them at the 
government’s mercy. Rather than helping individuals to change their 
legal situation, a number of entities such as favela residents’ associations 
refuse to provide support in this battle because they believe that this 
would reduce their own power, and a number of other individuals and 
groups fear that individual title would lead to gentrification and a 
breakdown of existing communities. This Article argues that title is 
likely a necessary tool for favela residents to obtain autonomy and for 
Brazil to fulfill its potential in the area of economic development. 
Part I traces the historical development of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas 
from early settlements to large-scale neighborhoods that house millions 
of people. Then, Part II describes the property laws that govern Rio, 
including zoning regulations and relevant administrative procedures. 
Part III explains how favela residents currently transfer their homes and 
businesses in the informal economy and what obstacles stand in the way 
of a titling system. In Part IV, the Article analyzes how the lack of title 
has contributed to the government’s ability to engage in takings for 
 
 9 Jonathan Watts, Forced Evictions in Rio Favela for 2016 Olympics Trigger Violent Clashes, 
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015, 5:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/forced-
evictions-vila-autodromo-rio-olympics-protests; see also Michael Powell, Officials Spent Big on 
Olympics, but Rio Natives Are Paying the Price, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/sports/olympics/rio-favelas-brazil-poor-price-too-high.html?_
r=0 (discussing removals in several neighborhoods of Rio). 
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sports events arbitrarily and without having to provide specific levels of 
compensation. This Part also suggests improvements to the current 
framework that would facilitate the creation of a robust titling system. 
The conclusion follows. 
I.     THE HISTORY OF RIO DE JANEIRO’S FAVELAS 
During Portugal’s occupation of Brazil, the country had a sesmaria 
system that distributed property to promote agriculture and 
colonization.10 The land was subject to a series of conditions such as 
limits on the land’s occupation and restrictions on its use to certain 
economic activities.11 The sesmaria could be transferred by contract or 
through inheritance, but the conditions regarding right of use could not 
be altered.12 In 1534, Portugal promoted the occupation of Brazilian 
territory through sesmarias.13 
The sesmaria system dissolved once Brazil gained independence, 
and in 1850, the Brazilian Parliament approved Imperial Law No. 601, 
Lei de Terras (Land Statute), along with other attempts at economic 
reform.14 The Land Statute created private property in Brazil for the first 
time and treated it as an individual and absolute right.15 “It converted 
sesmaria rights holders into landowners of the estates they already held, 
and extended the same ownership rights to anyone who possessed 
public land for at least 100 years before the statute’s passage.”16 By 1916, 
Brazil had adopted a Civil Code that introduced the country to the 
recording of deeds and stated that this “law ensures the owner the right 
to use, enjoy and dispose of his property and to recover it from whoever 
unjustly possesses it.”17 As described below, this first Civil Code 
encountered controversy regarding the favelas. 
Favelas are “squatter communities [that result] from invasions of 
public or private land.”18 Rio de Janeiro’s first favelas date back to a 
 
 10 LAURA BECK VARELA, DAS SESMARIAS À PROPRIEDADE MODERNA: UM ESTUDO DE 
HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 22–23 (2005). 
 11 Id. at 24. 
 12 Id. at 26–27. 
 13 Ronaldo Vainfas, Colonists and Settlers II—Brazil, in 1 IBERIA AND THE AMERICAS: 
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORY 270, 273 (J. Michael Francis ed., 2006). 
 14 Lei No. 601, de 18 de Setembro de 1850, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, 307: Setembro 1850 
(Braz.). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, The Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2011). 
 17 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (1916) art. 524 (Braz.). 
 18 Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil 
and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 445–46 (2006). For a discussion of the 
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settlement on a hill called Morro da Providência.19 Soldiers returning to 
Rio de Janeiro from a civil war, Guerra de Canudos, who were unable to 
afford shelter since they had not yet been paid, founded the favelas in 
1898.20 The civil war was against the settlers of Canudos, located in the 
Eastern province of Bahia.21 When Princess Isabel, the daughter of the 
last Brazilian emperor, signed a decree abolishing slavery in 1888, 
thousands of former slaves and indentured servants were left with no 
land or possessions.22 As such, the settlement at Canudos attracted 
former slaves, as well as other landless farmers, indigenous people, and 
destitute individuals.23 When they were in Bahia, the soldiers had 
become familiar with a hill called Canudos, a place that had bushes 
named favelas, which “provide[d] food for flocks of small, green-
feathered Illinger’s macaws.”24 When the soldiers settled on their hill in 
Rio de Janeiro, the place received the nickname “favela.”25 Urban 
squatting settlements that followed earned the name favela, in imitation 
of the soldiers’ community, both for the practice of squatting and for the 
low quality of land and housing.26 
Starting in the 1920s, the rate of growth of favelas increased 
because many individuals were leaving rural areas to move to cities.27 
These poor and new migrants sought work in the city, but with little to 
no money, they could not afford urban housing.28 Unable to find places 
to live, many of these individuals ended up in favelas.29 In 1937, the 
Código de Obras (Building Code) was the first official document to 
recognize the existence of favelas, “mark[ing] the beginning of explicit 
 
term “favela,” see Corinne Cath, On the Origin of ‘Favela’, RIOONWATCH (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=2920. 
 19 Greg O’Hare & Michael Barke, The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial 
Analysis, 56 GEOJOURNAL 225, 232 (2002). 
 20 Id.; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 515, 535–36 (2013). 
 21 Lori Madden, The Canudos War in History, 30 LUSO-BRAZ. REV. 5, 5 (1993). 
 22 Id. at 6; Brazil: Five Centuries of Change, Abolition, BROWN U. LIBR., https://
library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-4/abolition (last visited Apr. 
25, 2017). 
 23 See Madden, supra note 21, at 7. 
 24 JANICE A. PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO 
24 (2010) [hereinafter PERLMAN, FAVELA]; Cath, supra note 18. 
 25 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 24. 
 26 See 1 BRAZIL TODAY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC 253 (John J. Crocitti & 
Monique M. Vallance eds., 2012); Why We Should Call Them Favelas, CATCOMM.ORG, http://
catcomm.org/call-them-favelas (last visited Apr. 25, 2017). 
 27 JANICE E. PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY: URBAN POVERTY AND POLITICS IN RIO 
DE JANEIRO 13–14 (1976). 
 28 Id. at 14. 
 29 Id. 
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favela policies.”30 The Building Code categorized favelas as “an 
aberration” and prohibited them.31 It was expressly forbidden to build 
new favelas, and the Building Code banned the expansion of existing 
ones, as well as the “use of permanent building materials in favela 
construction.”32 City planners essentially “wanted them destroyed but 
failed to provide any alternative.”33 Then, in the 1940s, there was a 
housing crisis in Rio de Janeiro that forced the urban poor to erect 
hundreds of favelas in the suburbs, and they replaced residences as the 
main type of dwelling for destitute Cariocas (inhabitants of Rio).34 
Urbanization in the 1950s also triggered another mass migration 
from rural areas to the city by those hoping to take advantage of the 
economic opportunities that urban life provided.35 Nonetheless, when 
the capital moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960, there was a 
decline in employment opportunities.36 Therefore, many individuals 
who had moved to Rio de Janeiro were “[u]nable to find work” and 
“afford housing within the city limits,” so they remained in the favelas.37 
Even though the favelas were located relatively close to urban Rio de 
Janeiro, “the city did not extend sanitation, electricity, or other services 
to the favelas.”38 Under Governor Carlos Lacerda’s administration, 
many people were relocated to public housing projects such as Cidade 
de Deus (City of God), an area that became known later on due to a 
movie of the same name.39 Later, Brazil’s military dictatorship in the 
1970s decided to eradicate the favelas and return the land to its private 
and public owners, which displaced hundreds of thousands of 
inhabitants.40 These efforts, however, have been widely viewed as 
failures.41 For example, in some cases, “expelled” favela residents would 
 
 30 Thomas Frisch, Glimpses of Another World: The Favela as a Tourist Attraction, 14 
TOURISM GEOGRAPHIES 320, 324 (2012). 
 31 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 27. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Cath, supra note 18; Carioca, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/carioca (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 35 WORLD BANK, RURAL POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN BRAZIL: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED 
STRATEGY 89 (2003), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/673641468769760448/pdf/
267600PAPER0Ru1ation0See0also021790.pdf. 
 36 HELIA NACIF XAVIER & FERNANDA MAGALHAES, URBAN SLUM REPORTS: THE CASE OF 
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL 3 (2003), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/
Rio.pdf; Shanty Life in Brazil: Onward and Upward, ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010), http://
www.economist.com/node/16636391.  
 37 Victoria Baena, Favelas in the Spotlight: Transforming the Slums of Rio de Janeiro, 33 
HARV. INT’L REV. 34, 34–37 (2011). 
 38 Id. at 34. 
 39 Id. at 35. 
 40 Id. at 34–35; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 537. 
 41 Greg O’Hare, Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio’s Favelas, 86 GEOGRAPHY 61, 63 
(2001). 
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find themselves simply just living in a different favela.42 Since the 
demand for favela housing remained high while the supply in the formal 
market remained low, residents turned to the low-cost alternative of 
squatting in a new location.43 By the 1980s, the problem of violence 
accompanying drug trade in the favelas began overshadowing the 
previous concerns about eviction or eradication.44 
Residents of favelas are traditionally squatters, because they have 
no legal rights to the land.45 In other cases, residents who have occupied 
land with permission of the owner can also fail to obtain formal 
property rights.46 In many instances, residents purchase irregular lots of 
land that developers sold to them without observing “municipal 
subdivision and infrastructure regulations.”47 These illegal real estate 
subdivisions are known as loteamentos.48 The law does not recognize 
sales of lots in illegal loteamentos because the lots have not been 
formally subdivided, and thus they cannot be registered and neither can 
titles be issued.49 Loteamentos tend to pop up on the outskirts of the city 
where legal urban residential use is not an option.50  
Despite their unorthodox beginnings, favelas have become 
respected through social norms “notwithstanding the lack of formal 
property rights.”51 Although favelas often become communities that 
have regular features such as grocery stores and other local businesses, 
in the early days homes lacked basic utilities including electricity or 
plumbing.52 The Brazilian census in 1950 defined favelas not only by the 
absence of legal title, but also by low-quality housing, the absence of 
paved streets, and lack of public utilities such as plumbing.53 By 2001, 
however, residents in favelas generally had access to electricity and 
water.54 The majority of the favelas are located on steep hills that are 
 
 42 Cf. ORDE MORTON, RIO: THE STORY OF THE MARVELOUS CITY 303 (2015). 
 43 O’Hare & Barke, supra note 19, at 237. 
 44 Baena, supra note 37, at 35. 
 45 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 535. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Pindell, supra note 18, at 447. 
 48 Informações Sobre Favelas e Loteamentos—SABREN, PREFEITURA DO RIO DE JANEIRO 
(June 20, 2014), http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/web/ipp/exibeconteudo?id=4782931. 
 49 GEORGE MARTINE & GORDON MCGRANAHAN, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., UNITED 
NATIONS POPULATION FUND, BRAZIL’S EARLY URBAN TRANSITION: WHAT CAN IT TEACH 
URBANIZING COUNTRIES? 32 (2010). 
 50 Pindell, supra note 18, at 448. 
 51 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 535. 
 52 See id. at 536. 
 53 Fred B. Morris & Gerald F. Pyle, The Social Environment of Rio de Janeiro in 1960, 47 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 286, 288 (1971). 
 54 Alan M. White, Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to the City: Land Taxes and 
Rates for City Services in Brazil and the United States, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 313, 322 
(2013). 
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difficult to access; in fact, before it is settled by squatters, the invaded 
land is often considered unsuitable for human habitation.55 
In the West Zone of the city, favela residents live in barracos 
(shacks) that are not fully constructed, and many of the favelas and 
loteamentos do not have much access to urban services.56 In the South 
Zone, favelas are located on the hillsides of the Tijuca forest.57 The 
North Zone begins at Grande Tijuca, which is a middle-class area, and 
also where many of the favelas are located.58 Close to forty favelas have 
armed guards and gatekeepers that stand at the entrance to the favelas.59 
According to the latest census conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), there are 1,393,314 people in 763 
favelas in Rio de Janeiro.60 Additionally, approximately fifteen percent 
of Rio de Janeiro residents live in favelas or other “subnormal 
agglomerates.”61 Favelas are continuing “to grow at a faster pace than 
the population of the city as a whole.”62 The reason for favelas’ 
continued popularity remains a matter of controversy. Even though 
favela homes are made out of lower-quality materials, they offer 
migrants to cities inexpensive housing in convenient locations—
something not available in the formal housing market.63 Favela scholar 
Janice Perlman also found that home owners were less likely than 
renters to exit favelas because the owners “had invested their life savings 
in their houses, . . . expanded their dwellings to include space for their 
grown children and their families, and . . . stood to lose their investment 
if they left [the areas where] violence had devalued their property.”64 
Homeowners sometimes face a dilemma when it comes to moving 
because leaving the favela can mean giving up living space, moving 
farther away from the city, and/or giving up existing employment.65 
While there has been investment in government housing, said housing 
 
 55 Pindell, supra note 18, at 446–47. 
 56 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 31. 
 57 Id. at 32. 
 58  Rio de Janeiro, DAVIS HUNTER, http://www.davishunter.com/home/place/Rio%20de%
20Janeiro (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 59 Pacifying Police Units (UPP), CATCOMM.ORG, http://catcomm.org/upp (last visited July 
5, 2015). 
 60 Fiona Hurrell, Rio Favela Population Largest in Brazil: Daily, RIO TIMES (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/rios-favela-population-largest-in-brazil. 
 61 2010 Census: 11.4 Million Brazilians (6.0%) Live in Subnormal Agglomerates, INSTITUTO 
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://saladeimprensa.ibge.gov.br/
en/noticias?view=noticia&idnoticia=2057&t=censo-2010-11-4-milhoes-brasileiros-6-0-vivem-
aglomerados-subnormais. 
 62 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 536. 
 63 Id. at 537–38. 
 64 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 234. 
 65 See id. 
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at times does not meet the needs of favela residents.66 These needs 
include affordability, closeness to work and school, ability to access 
urban services, and “security against eviction.”67 Meanwhile, politicians 
have sought “the photo-op—at a ribbon-cutting ceremony in front of 
rows of colorfully painted little houses. They wanted rapid completion 
of the finished houses and rapid cost recuperation. Distance from the 
city or availability of public transportation were of no concern—they 
wanted the cheapest land possible. Thus the mismatch.”68 
II.     THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In favelas, the primary goal of the occupier is possession of the land 
on which she is living for as long as possible.69 In favelas and 
loteamentos, “residents generally live without formal property 
protections.”70 Created due to poor city planning, rapid growth, and a 
necessity for poor people to live somewhere, favelas and loteamentos 
arise outside of the legal, formal land market.71 Local governments have 
employed various reform efforts over the years with mixed results.72 
Although some of these initial efforts focused on hindering the growth 
of informal settlements, there have been measures for many years that 
have addressed the legalization of ownership of land in existing 
settlements and the improvement of infrastructure like roads and sewer 
services.73 
 
 66 See Constance G. Anthony, Urban Forced Removals in Rio De Janeiro and Los Angeles: 
North-South Similarities in Race and City, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 337, 348 (2013); 
Clarisse Cunha Linke, In Brazil, Connecting Social Housing with the City, INST. TRANSP. & DEV. 
POL’Y, Winter 2016, at 27, 27, https://www.itdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Brazil-Social-
Housing.pdf; Ruban Selvanayagam, No Better than the Slums? What Went Wrong with Brazil’s 
Social Housing, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/housing-
network/2014/mar/26/brazil-social-housing-favelas-slums. 
 67 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 268. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Pindell, supra note 18, at 448. 
 70 Id. at 445. 
 71 ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD 9 
(2005); Informações Sobre Favelas e Loteamentos—SABREN, supra note 48. 
 72 See generally WORLD BANK, BRAZIL: IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT: LEARNING FROM BEST 
PRACTICE IN FIVE URBAN PROJECTS, NO. 16736 (1997). 
 73 See id. at ix; see also Catherine Osborn, A History of Favela Upgrades Part II: Introducing 
Favela–Bairro (1988–2008), RIOONWATCH (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=
5931. 
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A.     The Legal Framework of Property Rights in Rio de Janeiro 
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre popularized a “right to the city” 
concept, which merged two notions: “[T]he social function of property 
and the social function of the city.”74 Additionally, the author of the 
Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, Clovis Bevilaqua, also implied that there is 
a concept that property rights serve a social function.75 Its principles 
have since been adopted in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and the 2001 
City Statute.76 The National Movement for Urban Reform insisted that 
inequalities in Brazilian land ownership had to be redressed as the 
country’s dictatorial government was crumbling and the 1988 
Constitution was in the process of being written. When Brazil was 
coming out of a dictatorial political model, and the 1988 Constitution 
was being drafted, the National Movement for Urban Reform was very 
adamant about advocating for legal measures that would combat 
centuries of unequal concentration of land ownership in Brazil.77 
“Academics, activists and neighborhood associations worked together, 
and as a result, the social use of land and the right for small-scale urban 
land ownership was included in the [1988] constitution.”78 Specifically, 
Article 170 in Chapter One’s “The General Principles of Economic 
Activity” speaks about the “social function of property.”79 Additionally, 
Article 183 of Chapter Two’s Urban Policy explicitly states that: 
  An individual who possesses as theirs an urban area up to two 
hundred and fifty square meters, for five years, without interruption 
or opposition, using it as his or as his family’s home, shall acquire 
domain of it, provided that he does not own any other urban or rural 
property.  
  The deed of possession and concession of use shall be granted to 
the man or woman, or both, regardless of their marital status.80 
 
 74 Pindell, supra note 18, at 436. 
 75 Cunha, supra note 16, at 1174. 
 76 Id. at 1176; Evaniza Rodrigues & Benedito Roberto Barbosa, Popular Movements and the 
City Statute, in THE CITY STATUTE OF BRAZIL: A COMMENTARY 23, 25 (2010), http://
www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Images/CityStatuteofBrazil_English_
fulltext.pdf. 
 77 Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, CATCOMM.ORG, http://catcomm.org/adverse-
possession (last visited June 23, 2015). 
 78 Id. 
 79 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 170 (Braz.). 
 80 Id. art. 183. 
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As such, the federal guarantee of the right to adverse possession for the 
purpose of housing stemmed from the 1988 Constitution, and was 
based on the “social function of property.”81 
The 2001 City Statute builds on the 1988 Constitution to create a 
new legal system that provides land access and equity in large urban 
cities.82 The Statute has two main functions: (1) to ensure that the 
“social function” of urban land and buildings is put before their 
commercial value, and (2) to guarantee “democratic city 
management . . . [and] a path to plan, produce, operate and govern cities 
subject to social control and participation of civil society.”83 Moreover, 
the 2001 City Statute has sixteen guidelines to advance the social 
function of the city, including “the ‘right to sustainable cities,’ the 
promotion of community participation in the creation and monitoring 
of development projects, an emphasis on effective planning of urban 
areas, and the ‘regularization of land ownership and urbanization of 
areas occupied by low income populations’” (i.e., favelas).84 The Statute 
also creates a “Concession of Law for public lands in which squatters 
[i.e., residents of favelas] can obtain use rights (as opposed to ownership 
rights) for public lands that they occupy.”85 It states that: 
Whomever [sic], until June 30, 2001, possesses as his or her own, for 
a period five years, without interruption and without opposition, up 
to two hundred and fifty square meters of public real estate located in 
an urban area, using it for his own residence or that of his family, has 
the right to concession of special use for housing purposes in relation 
to the property that is the object of said possession, as long as he is 
not the owner or concessionaire, in any form, of any other urban or 
rural real estate.86 
While the residents of many favelas could apply for title under Article 
183 of the 1988 Constitution and the 2001 City Statute, they would have 
to show the government documentary evidence of their history.87 With 
Brazil hosting mega sports events, such as the 2014 World Cup and the 
2016 Olympics, several favelas came under greater threats of removal, 
which increased residents’ interest in accessing title.88 
 
 81 Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, supra note 77. 
 82 See Rodrigues & Barbosa, supra note 76, at 25. 
 83 @thepolisblog, Implementing the Right to the City in Brazil?, SMARTCITIESDIVE (Oct. 14, 
2011), http://www.smartcitiesdive.com/ex/sustainablecitiescollective/implementing-right-city-
brazil/30417. 
 84 Pindell, supra note 18, at 454. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 11.7.2001 
(Braz.). 
 87 Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, supra note 77. 
 88 Id. 
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According to Bevilaqua, property rights must be subjected to 
“restrictions determined by considerations of social order. And modern 
Codes are leaning toward finding a balance between the individual’s 
interest and that of society.”89 This concept was further solidified 
through the adoption of the 2002 Civil Code.90 The first paragraph of 
the 2002 Civil Code states: 
The right of property must be exercised in accordance with its 
economic, social and environmental ends, so that the flora, fauna and 
natural beauties are preserved, as well as the ecological equilibrium 
and the historical and artistic patrimonies, and so that air and water 
pollution are averted, in obedience of the rules established by specific 
legislation.91 
Thus, the Code connects the exercise of property rights to “economic, 
social, and environmental ends.”92 The 2002 Civil Code also identifies 
three types of adverse possession: (1) ordinary adverse possession, (2) 
extraordinary adverse possession, and (3) special adverse possession.93 
First, ordinary adverse possession transfers ownership of property to the 
individual who, intending to become its owner, remains in possession of 
said property, undisputedly and without opposition, for a continuous 
period of between five and fifteen years.94 Second, extraordinary adverse 
possession transfers ownership of the property to the individual who 
remains in possession of said property for a continuous period of fifteen 
years, regardless of the existence of any proof.95 Additionally, if the 
property has been the owner’s residence, or if the individual has 
improved the land in some way, the statutory period is reduced to ten 
years.96 Third, special urban adverse possession occurs when an 
individual who is not a title-owner of an urban or rural property and 
remains in possession of that property—as her place of residence for a 
continuous period without any opposition—is granted title to said 
 
 89 1 CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, DIREITO DAS COISAS 134 (1941); Cunha, supra note 16, at 1174. 
 90 Cunha, supra note 16, at 1180. 
 91 C.C. (2002) art. 1228, § 1 (Braz.); see also Cunha, supra note 16, 1180. 
 92 Cunha, supra note 16, at 1180. 
 93 C.C. (2002) art. 1242 (Braz.); see also Ellade Imparato, Security of Tenure in São Paulo, in 
HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 127, 129 (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002). 
 94 C.C. (2002) art. 1242 (Braz.); see also José Isaac Pilati, Property Law, in INTRODUCTION 
TO BRAZILIAN LAW 71, 74 (Fabiano Deffenti & Welber Barral eds., 2011); JC Moraes, Resumo: 
Usucapião—Espécies e Requisitos, JCMORAES.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), https://jcmoraes.com/2011/
04/14/resumo-usucapiao-%E2%80%93-especies-e-requisitos. 
 95 C.C. (2002) art. 1238 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, DOING BUSINESS IN 
BRAZIL 12-5 (2013); Pilati, supra note 94, at 74. 
 96 C.C. (2002) art. 1238 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 12-
5; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74. 
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property.97 The property may not exceed 250 square meters and must be 
the place of residence of the owner or her family.98 Further, special 
adverse possession happens when an individual who is not a title-owner 
of an urban or rural property, and remains in possession of that 
property for a continuous period of five years, having improved it 
through her or her family’s efforts, and with it being her place of 
residence without any opposition, receives the right to acquire title to 
said property.99 The total area of the rural property must not exceed fifty 
hectares.100 
These recent attempts to advocate for a “right to the city” show 
how complex it is to address individualized understandings of 
property.101 Furthermore, these measures suggest that national policies 
can encourage implementation at the local level.102 For example, at the 
local level, residents whose formal property rights conflict can have a 
meaningful exchange thanks to programs that evaluate the property 
distribution scheme that is in place.103 
B.     Zoning Regulations 
To fully understand the obstacles that future reforms face, it is 
important to grasp the structure of zoning regulations in Rio de Janeiro. 
The Law of Land Use and Occupation (LUOS), established in 2013, sets 
forth principles and guidelines for the use and occupation of urban 
space, and the ultimate goal of the law is to ensure the development of 
the city in a balanced and sustainable way.104 Most of the rules that 
govern the use of land and space involve calculations.  
When a new building is being constructed, homebuilders must 
apply the formula ATE = IAT x S.105 As such, the total buildable area 
(ATE) is the maximum buildable area that results from multiplying the 
Land Utilization Index (IAT), which is the number of days when crops 
 
 97 C.C. (2002) art. 1240 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 12-
5; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74. 
 98 C.C. (2002) art. 1240 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 12-
5; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74. 
 99 C.C. (2002) art. 1239 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 12-
5; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74–75. 
 100 C.C. (2002) art. 1239 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 12-
5; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74–75. 
 101 Pindell, supra note 18, at 458. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 1 (Braz.); see also 
SECRETARIA MUNICIPAL DE URBANISMO, RIO PREFEITURA, LEI DE USO E OCUPAÇÃO DO SOLO 
LUOS, http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/documents/91237/ddbd40f5-fa89-40ff-b7e3-c2a9339f578d. 
 105 Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 140 (Braz.). 
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occupy the land during a year divided by 365, by the land area (S).106 
LUOS may establish differentiated Land Utilization Indices within the 
same district according to the land’s characteristics, but they are subject 
to the maximum values set out in Annex VII of Rio de Janeiro’s Master 
Plan, which lists all of the barrios in Rio de Janeiro and their 
corresponding IATs.107 Locations that are being built that cannot use the 
ATE calculation include: (1) parking garages; (2) concierge and access 
buildings; (3) custodian’s apartment and common areas; (4) water 
tanks, engine rooms, and other technical compartments located at any 
level of the building; (5) verandas and balconies; (6) uncovered terraces; 
(7) covered terraces for common use; and (8) watchtowers and 
aedicule.108 
The maximum occupancy rate allowed (TO) represents the ratio 
between the maximum horizontal projection allowed for the building 
and the total area of land.109 It is expressed in the following formula: 
 
TO = Area Horizontal Projection of Maximum Building x 100 
Total Area of Land110 
 
The maximum horizontal projection of buildings includes all the 
covered areas of the building, excluding the areas designed for porches, 
balconies, and overhangs.111 Additionally, in single-family and two-
family buildings, the balconies resting on the ground will also not be 
included in the maximum area of projection.112 
The maximum building height is measured between the ground-
floor level and the highest point of the building, including all elements 
except: (1) mechanical equipment, water tanks, engine rooms, stairway 
enclosures common to the roof level; (2) ventilation ducts of enclosed 
stairs; (3) underground floors buried and semi-buried, in accordance 
with article 169 of the LUOS; and (4) vertical access on land uphill in 
accordance with Articles 166 and 173 of the LUOS.113 Furthermore, the 
maximum height and the maximum number of floors in a building are 
established by considering the relevant interests of the surrounding 
landscape and the urban environment where they are located, including: 
(1) the street width; (2) aeration of the city blocks; (3) the altitude and 
natural topography of the land; (4) waterfront, protected bodies of 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 Lei Complementar No. 111, de 1 de Fevereiro de 2011, Anexo VII (Braz.). 
 108 Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 142 (Braz.). 
 109 Id. art. 149. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. art. 150. 
 112 Id. art. 150, § 1. 
 113 Id. art. 162. 
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water, and mountains; (5) the maximum shading allowed on the 
beaches; (6) preserved goods; (7) use and type of building; (8) existing 
infrastructure or projected infrastructure; (9) restriction cones and 
bands imposed for airports and aerodromes in specific legislation; and 
(10) occupancy characteristics of the surroundings.114  
Municipal law has the ability to designate areas that contain many 
clashes in land ownership, including favelas, as “special social interest 
zones.”115 This legally assures the stability of residents’ homes by legally 
acknowledging that these types of areas are intended to provide housing 
to groups that rely on being able to continue living in informal 
settlements, such as favelas.116 Furthermore, designating such areas as 
“special social interest zones” helps avoid any forced evictions that 
would result from breaking zoning laws.117 Whenever residents confront 
the possibility of eviction, courts can rule for the social group that lives 
in the informal settlement and begin a negotiation conversation 
between whoever owns the area, the inhabitants, and the government.118 
C.     The Cartório System 
Any reform proposals will require a clear grounding in Brazil’s 
system of administration and title registration. One key piece of this 
system is the cartório, who is essentially a notary that takes care of 
several different types of important documents.119 The majority of 
documents in Brazil that require a signature, including, but not limited 
to, a power of attorney, title of property, marriage certificates, and more, 
must be notarized by a cartório for them to be recognized as legal 
documents.120 
After the fall of the Roman Empire and during the ascent of the 
Catholic Church, the cartório system took over the registration of births 
and deaths.121 Initially, it was mostly just registering nobles, kings, 
 
 114 Id. art. 161. 
 115 Nelson Saule Junior, The Right to Housing and the Prevention of Forced Evictions in 
Brazil, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 93, at 138, 147. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 O que é Serventia Extrajudicial (Cartório)?, PODER JUDICIÁRIO, http://www7.tjce.jus.br/
sefin/?page_id=945 [https://web.archive.org/web/20160417080253/http://www7.tjce.jus.br/
sefin/?page_id=945]. 
 120 Id.; see also Patrick Bruha, Notary Public Offices in Brazil, BRAZ. BUS. (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/notary-public-offices-in-brazil. 
 121 Robério Fernandes, A Origem Dos Cartórios de Registros Civis, HISTÓRIA E SUAS 
CURIOSIDADES (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:59 PM), http://historiaesuascuriosidades.blogspot.com/2011/02/
origem-dos-cartorios-de-registros-civis.html. 
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clerics, and others who were considered important.122 France has a long 
tradition of universally registering births and graves.123 The country 
began to register these events in the mid-sixteenth century, an initiative 
that the Catholic Church started.124 After the Council of Trent ended in 
1563, the Church officially implemented civil registration and 
registration of deaths across socioeconomic strata.125 With the adoption 
of the Napoleonic Code in the the early-nineteenth century, France 
officially transferred the responsibility of civil registration to the State.126 
Similarly, in Brazil the Church also transitioned away from 
maintaining such records in the second half of the nineteenth century.127 
In 1863, through a decree, the imperial government started recording 
the marriages of non-Catholics, and, in 1874, the process of recording 
and registering birth, marriage, and death certificates began in Brazil.128 
The word cartório was originally coined in Portugal to designate a 
recorder or notary.129 In Brazil, the word came to designate an entity 
that possessed a wider range of skills and responsibilities, including civil 
registration of individuals and legal entities, property registration, 
registration of deeds and documents, notary notes, bonds, court 
documents, and more.130  
The Brazilian Constitution describes cartórios and registrar services 
as “extrajudicial services.”131 Private individuals, who act under 
authority delegated to them by the State, provide both cartório and 
property registration services.132 Although these individuals are not 
technically “state employees” or “public officials,” under article 327 of 
the Brazilian Criminal Code, they can be considered public officials and 
held liable for certain criminal actions.133 According to Law 8.935, which 
was established in 1994, general cartórios, known as tabeliaes de notas, 
and property registrars, known as oficiais de registro de imóveis,134 have 
ample power to manage their offices and may contract as many 
assistants (substitutes, clerks, and auxiliaries) as they deem necessary to 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Cartório, WORDREFERENCE.COM, http://www.wordreference.com/pten/cartório (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2017); História dos Cartórios, ARPEN.SP, http://www.arpensp.org.br/principal/
index.cfm?pagina_id=181 (last visited June 24, 2015). 
 130 História dos Cartórios, supra note 129. 
 131 Id.; see also C.F. art. 236 (Braz.). 
 132 C.F. art. 236 (Braz.). 
 133 Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 327 (Braz.). 
 134 See generally 12 REGISTRO DE IMÓVEIS DO RIO DE JANEIRO, https://
www.12registro.com.br (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
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assist them in providing efficient services.135 General cartórios have 
exclusive authority to draft public writings and powers of attorneys, 
notarial acts, and authenticate signatures and copies.136 Cartórios may 
only exercise authority within the municipality in which they have been 
appointed.137 To become a notary, an individual must, among other 
things, take a public examination, have a legal degree or at least ten 
years of experience in notarial or register services, and exhibit 
professional conduct in accordance with ethical business standards.138 
There is no requirement in any of the regulations that cartórios post any 
bond or acquire insurance to cover their liability.139 
Cartórios and registrars are liable to third parties for damages 
caused by any act performed by them or their respective assistants that 
violate a formal requirement of their duties.140 Additionally, the State 
has subsidiary liability because cartórios and registrars perform 
functions delegated by the State.141 Injured parties must first sue the 
cartório, and can only make a claim against the State if such suit has 
been successful and the cartório does not have funds to cover the 
claim.142 In practice, however, litigation in Brazil is a complex and 
lengthy proposition.  
III.     THE EVOLUTION OF FAVELA—STATE RELATIONSHIP 
A.     The History of and the Current Mechanisms for Real Estate 
Transactions Inside the Favelas 
The history of Brazilian politics and the history of favela growth 
inform the evolving and fluctuating relationship between the Brazilian 
government and the favelas.143 The relationship, at any given time, is 
further complicated by the fact that any given favela may be located on 
land owned by an amalgam of interests.144 A favela may sit on parcels of 
land that are owned by the federal government, the state government, 
 
 135 Lei No. 8.935, de 18 de Novembro de 1994, arts. 20–21, D.O.U. de 21.11.1994 (Braz.). 
 136 Id. art. 7. 
 137 Id. art. 9. 
 138 Id. arts. 14–19. 
 139 See id. 
 140 Id. arts. 22–24. 
 141 See, e.g., R.S.T.J., Ap. Civ. No. 2008/0204801-9, Relator: Des. Herman Benjamin, 
02.02.2010 (Braz.). 
 142 See, e.g., id. 
 143 See generally Anthony, supra note 66. 
 144 See JANICE E. PERLMAN, INT’L HOUS. COAL., IT ALL DEPENDS: BUYING AND SELLING 
HOUSES IN RIO’S FAVELAS 11−12 (2010) [hereinafter PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS], http://
ihcglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/perlman-final-final-paper.pdf. 
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the municipal government, and one or more private parties.145 Thus, a 
uniform policy toward regularizing the ownership within a given favela, 
much less across the favelas, is quite hard to implement.146 These 
difficulties are compounded by the putative beneficiaries’ lack of 
understanding147 and of resources to navigate a complex judicial and 
administrative system.148 This Section will describe the evolution of the 
government policy toward the favelas, the current state of affairs, as well 
as the perception of the current state of affairs by the residents of the 
favelas themselves. 
The relationship between the Brazilian authorities and the favelas 
has undergone a substantial evolution and is still in a state of 
considerable flux. Given their origin as settlements for discharged 
soldiers and freed slaves149—both relatively outcast groups—it is not 
surprising that the favelas were a breeding ground for non-conformist 
behavior of all types.150 Indeed, the very creation of favelas in violation 
of the law and property rights of true owners was a subversive act.151 
The government’s response to these acts, therefore, often tracked the 
government’s general toleration of non-conforming behavior.152 
The first thrust against the favelas happened in 1937 during the so-
called Estado Novo (New State) era.153 That year, Getúlio Vargas 
assumed dictatorial powers and abolished Congress and political 
 
 145 Id. at 12. For example, the favela of “Santa Marta has three parts, two are private and 
anything that is above . . . 100 meters and the hill belongs to the government.” Interview with 
Favela Residents 29 (Feb. 7, 2016) (transcript and audio on file with authors). 
 146 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 12 (“There are favelas in which land ownership 
of a particular parcel is contested among the descendents [sic] of private owners who claim to 
have historic deeds. Under existing land use laws, these claims have to be adjudicated parcel by 
parcel and lot by lot, so no overall resolution of land tenure for the entire community is 
possible.”). 
 147 See id. at 17 (describing how unscrupulous individuals take advantage of favela residents 
who are unable to understand the “fine print” of legal documents). 
 148 See Adam Smith, The Cantagalo Project: Judicial and Administrative Land Titling in the 
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, DIVERSITATES, Dec. 2011, at 19, 36, https://
diversitatesjournal.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/diversitates_3_-n-2_-artigo-2.pdf (“The first 
significant obstacle to the adoption of administrative land titling is the cost of the project.”). 
 149 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text; see also Anthony, supra note 66, at 344. 
 150 See PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at XXIII–XXIV. 
 151 See generally Peter Bishop, From the Subversive to the Serious: Temporary Urbanism as a 
Positive Force, in PAVILIONS, POP-UPS AND PARASOLS: THE IMPACT OF REAL AND VIRTUAL 
MEETING ON PHYSICAL SPACE 136 (Leon van Schaik & Fleur Watson eds., 2015). 
 152 See ERIKA ROBB LARKINS, THE SPECTACULAR FAVELA: VIOLENCE IN MODERN BRAZIL 8 
(2015). 
 153 See Enrique R. Carrasco & Sean Williams, Emerging Economies After the Global Financial 
Crisis: The Case of Brazil, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 93 (2012) (describing the establishment 
of Estado Novo). 
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parties.154 Not coincidentally, that same year, a new building code was 
promulgated which “strictly forb[ade] the building of new favelas and 
[the improvement of] any aspect of established buildings.”155 By 1940, 
the Vargas regime began “wholesale razing” of the favelas, with the 
concomitant attempts to move the disposed residents into public 
housing.156 Although promoted as a way to improve living conditions 
and reduce poverty among the residents of the favelas,157 the project had 
another goal in mind as well. The “entry gates, ID cards, and an evening 
loud speaker that broadcast lectures on moral behavior”158 within the 
new public housing projects were “designed not only to accommodate 
but also to isolate and control.”159 Furthermore, and as is common in 
non-democratic regimes, corruption prevailed and “[t]he best 
units . . . went to public employees and those with influence.”160 The 
Estado Novo came to an end in 1945161 and with it, the policy of favela 
eradication ended162 (though as described below, only for a while). The 
top-down policies of the Vargas regime “did not result in a more vibrant 
community, less poverty, and did not solve the low-income housing 
crisis.”163 
With the return to democracy, the policies toward favelas shifted 
from eradication to amelioration, though not yet to regularization of 
ownership.164 The new government, now in need of votes from the 
residents of the favelas, began to provide some services, including roads, 
clinics, power lines, etc.165 At the same time, the threat of eviction and 
dispossession remained omnipresent, thus providing a powerful 
combination for the authorities—they could entice votes with various 
improvement projects, while at the same time threatening the 
recalcitrant residents with eviction.166 The Catholic Church, consistent 
 
 154 See Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 580 (2005) [hereinafter 
Rosenn, Federalism]; Keith S. Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839, 843–
44 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenn, Separation of Powers]. 
 155 Anthony, supra note 66, at 346. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. (quoting ROBERT GAY, POPULAR ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN RIO DE 
JANEIRO: A TALE OF TWO FAVELAS 16 (1994)). 
 160 Id. 
 161 See Rosenn, Separation of Powers, supra note 154, at 845. 
 162 See Anthony, supra note 66, at 346. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. at 346–47 (“With democracy came more attention to social welfare and the 
deceleration of favela eradication.”). 
 165 See GAY, supra note 159, at 18; Lea Ramsdell, National Housing Policy and the Favela in 
Brazil, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRAZIL: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION 164, 
167 (Lawrence S. Graham & Robert H. Wilson eds., 1990). 
 166 GAY, supra note 159, at 18; Anthony, supra note 66, at 347. 
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with its mission to help the poor, also began addressing the problems 
with favela life.167 In 1955, Dom Hélder Câmara, the then-Bishop of 
Recife and Auxiliary Bishop of Rio de Janeiro, started the Cruzada São 
Sebastião (St. Sebastian’s Crusade), which was a federal scheme to 
construct an apartment complex in the largest horizontal favela at the 
time, Praia do Pinto.168 The goal of the Cruzada was to transform favela 
residents into more acceptable citizens by only housing those willing to 
give up the corruptions associated with favela life.169  
As mentioned previously, the policies toward the favelas have 
tracked the political situation overall. So when in 1964 an additional 
coup resulted in yet another military dictatorship,170 the State’s policy 
toward the favelas reverted back to that of the 1930s and 1940s.171 The 
Brazilian military government of the 1960s and 1970s has a well-
deserved reputation as a brutal and oppressive regime that did not 
tolerate much, if any, dissent.172 This attitude was also projected onto 
the favelas. As a result, once again, the policy was that of favela 
eradication in preference to any other approach.173 During this period, 
the favelas that occupied particularly attractive locations were the most 
targeted for demolition.174 In all, over 175,000 Cariocas residing in 
favelas were dispossessed of their homes with the land being used for 
the benefit of parties more in favor with the ruling junta.175 The military 
government of the 1960s also copied the attempts of its 1940s 
predecessor to build public housing for the displaced favela residents 
where the latter could be better “controlled.”176 This attempt was an 
 
 167 Anthony, supra note 66, at 346; Smith, supra note 148, at 22. 
 168 Julio Cesar Pino, Sources on the History of the Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, 32 LATIN AM. 
RES. REV. 111, 114 (1997); The Disappearing Favelas, RIO THEN (Dec. 18, 2013), https://
riothen.wordpress.com/tag/praia-do-pinto. 
 169 Pino, supra note 168, at 114. 
 170 Rosenn, Federalism, supra note 154, at 581. 
 171 Anthony, supra note 66, at 347. 
 172 See Kristin Tennyson Graham et al., Mobilizing Law in Latin America: An Evaluation of 
Black’s Theory in Brazil, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 322, 323–24 (2013); Brazil: Report on Past 
Atrocities a Key Step Forward, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2007, 8:00 PM) https://
www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/30/brazil-report-past-atrocities-key-step-forward (“Brazil has 
finally released a comprehensive account of the brutal methods that its military regime used to 
dispose of political opponents.”). 
 173 See Cristiane Rose Duarte & Fernanda Magalhães, Upgrading Squatter Settlements into 
City Neighborhoods, in CONTEMPORARY URBANISM IN BRAZIL: BEYOND BRASÍLIA 268 (Vicente 
del Rio & William Siembieda eds., 2009) (“[G]overnment policies took a radical approach by 
viewing favelas as a malaise that should be removed from cities.”). 
 174 Id. (noting that most of the removed favelas were “occupying attractive sites near the 
coastline and in middle-class neighborhoods”). 
 175 Anthony, supra note 66, at 348. 
 176 See id. (“The large-scale public housing in the north that was created was similar to the 
Parque Prolitarios but even less attentive to the needs of its residents for community and urban 
amenities.”); Michel Jaquet, Cidade de Deus—Working with Informalized Mass Housing in 
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even bigger failure than its 1940s cousin and is perhaps best exemplified 
by the flagship project Cidade de Deus or “City of God” in English.177 
Because the junta’s actual goal was not alleviation of poverty or 
improvement in the lot of the poor (as the junta did not need their 
electoral or economic support),178 the Cidade de Deus project was 
located far from the center of Rio, and with little to no access to things 
like electricity or running water.179 Those familiar with the eponymous 
film know the end result of this project, and that, far from being a 
solution to any of the favela problems, the public housing project 
concentrated poverty even further and became a breeding ground for 
violence, drug trade, disease, and early and untimely death.180 What is 
even more remarkable is that Cidade de Deus, originally conceived as an 
orderly public housing project, itself became a favela as soon as the 
military junta relaxed its grip on the country.181 
The eradication process began to significantly slow down as Brazil 
entered the 1980s.182 At the time, the military’s position began to 
weaken as the opposition to its iron-fisted rule grew.183 The Catholic 
Church (again mirroring the post-Estado Novo period) regained much 
influence and expanded its work in the favelas.184 Indeed, as a current 
resident recounted, the Church’s influence became so great that some of 
the favelas became known as “pastoral favelas.”185 However, once again, 
the Church could do little to change the fundamental legal issues in the 
favelas—the lack of legal rights to the homes that the favela residents 
 
Brazil by Marc Angélil and Rainer Hehl [Book Review], RIOONWATCH (Apr. 5, 2014), http://
www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14308. 
 177 See Jaquet, supra note 176. 
 178 Anthony, supra note 66, at 339 ("[An authoritarian] state need not be attentive to 
elections or the need for legitimacy with a larger constituency. As a consequence, the state 
privileges some population groups over others in the urban, political imagination.” (footnote 
omitted)); Jaquet, supra note 176. 
 179 See Favelas: City of God, JAUREGUI (last visited July 17, 2016), http://
www.jauregui.arq.br/favelas_city_of_god.html; see also BRYAN MCCANN, HARD TIMES IN THE 
MARVELOUS CITY: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY IN THE FAVELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO 
31–32 (2014). 
 180 See Alex Bellos, Film Shows Violence of Rio’s Gangster Children, but the Reality Is Far 
Worse, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Jan. 23, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/GWeekly/Story/
0,,879929,00.html. 
 181 See Jaquet, supra note 176. 
 182 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 7; Anthony, supra note 66, at 348−49; 
Smith, supra note 148, at 23−24. 
 183 Anthony, supra note 66, at 348−49. 
 184 See John C. Martin, Note, Bringing Dead Capital to Life: International Mandates for Land 
Titling in Brazil, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 121 (2008). 
 185 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 40–41; see also Pastoral Land 
Commission (CPT), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/
encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/pastoral-land-commission-cpt (last visited Apr. 
28, 2017); cf. Taylor Reeves Dalton, Rights for the Landless: Comparing Approaches to Historical 
Injustice in Brazil and South Africa, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 171, 183–84 (2012). 
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occupied.186 Even with the abatement of the eradication process, the 
residents of the favelas remained at the mercy of government officials 
who could expel them at whim, because, after all, the residents had no 
legal right to be on the land in question.187 
Making matters worse still, when the military finally surrendered 
power in the mid to late 1980s, it bequeathed the new civilian 
government massive economic problems.188 With the Brazilian 
economy plagued by hyperinflation, soaring unemployment, and high 
interest rates,189 the underprivileged residents of the favelas were the 
hardest hit.190 At the same time, and perhaps in part because of the 
absence of legitimate avenues for economic improvement, Brazil as a 
whole, and Rio in particular, became a major hub for international drug 
trafficking.191 Rio’s favelas presented a perfect milieu for the gangs that 
sought to control the flow of drugs and money.192 Not only were the 
favelas poor, but their physical characteristics were often ideal for illegal 
 
 186 See generally Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach 
to Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 557, 571 (2003). 
 187 See, e.g., PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 4 (“The possibility of eviction is much 
lower since the return to democracy in 1985 following 21 years of military dictatorship, but in 
the past five years the issue has been raised again. As recently as 2009, the Mayor of Rio 
declared that with regard to favela policy, ‘nothing is off the table.’”); id. at 15 (noting that 
prices within favelas vary according to the risk of removal); id. at 24 (noting that there is always 
risk of favela removal, especially “where land values are high”); Anthony, supra note 66, at 351 
(“In 2005, the city’s Public Prosecutor’s office wanted to see fourteen favelas removed, all of 
which were proximate to middle class neighborhoods.”). The favela residents know about the 
precariousness of their situation. One of them explained that the uncertainty has made people 
skeptical even of government documents that confer some rights to the land, stating “what 
we’re saying now is even in favelas where people actually had that document, if the government 
wants to evict them they will anyway, so there isn’t that much of a point for it.” Interview with 
Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 31. 
 188 See Marcos Aurélio Pereira Valadao, Washington Consensus and Latin America 
Integration: Mercosur and the Road to Regional Inconsistencies—To Where Are We Going 
Exactly?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 207, 211 (2009); William H. Page, Antitrust Review of 
Mergers in Transition Economies: A Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1113, 1119 (1998). 
 189 See Janice E. Perlman, The Metamorphosis of Marginality: Four Generations in the 
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 606 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 154, 154–55 (2006) 
[hereinafter Perlman, Metamorphosis]. See generally Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, The Brazilian 
Economy, 1980–1994 (Pontifical Catholic Univ., Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 492, 
2004), http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td492.pdf. 
 190 Isabella Di Paolo, Inflation and Instability: Brazil’s Lost Decade and Cardoso’s Response, 
27 STUDENT ECON. REV. 99, 101 (2013) (“As high and volatile inflation rates damaged 
economic performance, Brazil’s poorest were hit the hardest.”). 
 191 See Anthony, supra note 66, at 350; Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Past and Present, BROWN 
U. LIBR., http://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-9/favelas-in-
rio-de-janeiro-past-and-present (last visited July 17, 2016). 
 192 See Sandra Jovchelovitch, Life and Death in the Favelas of Brazil, LSE CONNECT, Summer 
2012, at 11, 11, http://www.lse.ac.uk/alumni/LSEConnect/pdf/summer2012/Life-and-death-in-
the-favelas-of-Brazil.pdf.  
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activities.193 Thus, for example, the narrow streets with convoluted and 
randomly created passageways—all of which often lack a formal 
address, making them nearly impossible to find for anyone not part of 
the favela community—created a hospitable environment for the gangs 
to conduct their activities undetected by the police forces and to win 
outright confrontations with rival gangs or law enforcement officials.194 
The takeover of the favelas by armed gangs had a significant impact on 
the development of property rights in the favelas—an effect that 
reverberates to this day.195 
As favelas grew, the life within them began to be organized—first 
completely informally and then with some quasi-recognition from the 
government.196 As the favelas began to grow, there was often a need to 
expand existing property or to buy a bigger house for an expanding 
family.197 A mechanism developed to facilitate these transactions outside 
of the regular business of real estate because neither buyers nor sellers 
legally owned that which they were buying and selling and there were no 
legally recognized means to verify whether the person selling the 
dwelling indeed owned it—even in the colloquial sense of the word.198 
The favela communities organized into residents’ associations—a form 
of local self-government responsible for the inner workings of the 
favelas.199 It is both curious and understandable that favelas were 
required to have formal associations starting in the 1960s—for example, 
during the time of the second military government.200 It is curious 
because the military government’s goal was eradication rather than 
regularization of favelas,201 whereas requiring any sort of formal 
structure would seem to be contrary to such goals. On the other hand, 
because control of the population (including that living in the favelas) 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. During an interview with a 
president of one of the favelas’ residents’ associations, he explained that although “all have a 
name and number . . . it’s made up and it’s not official. And the main thing is they haven’t got a 
zip code . . . you don’t have an official address where you can receive a letter, for example. Folks 
can find you, but within the communities.” Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 
42. 
 195 See generally PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144. 
 196 See generally Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction 
and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 118−19 (1977) (describing 
the rise of the residents’ associations). 
 197 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. 
 198 See William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 493 (2010). 
 199 Sousa Santos, supra note 196, at 118–19. 
 200 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. 
 201 See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text. 
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was the junta’s paramount goal,202 creating structures that would make 
such control easier made perfect sense.203 
The residents’ associations, each headed by a president, “are the 
internal arm of local authority, the liaison between the community and 
the government and the voice of the favela community in public 
matters,” and “are authorized to act with some degree of public 
authority within their own territories.”204 As such, these entities are 
indispensable for real estate transactions within the community.205 The 
elected officials of the association would verify that the person selling 
the real estate was in fact the one that “owned” it, and would also record 
the buyer as a new “owner.”206 These verifications could be 
accomplished with relative ease because everyone involved (buyer, 
seller, and the verifying official) was part of the same community and 
knew each other.207 In this environment, further assurances were often 
unnecessary.208 
Indeed, the informal (or to be charitable, semi-formal) system of 
real estate transactions worked fairly well for the residents of a given 
community.209 While the transactions in the favelas do not fully match 
those in the city proper, they are comparable.210 Engaging in real estate 
transactions in Brazil within the formal city boundaries is somewhat 
similar to engaging in real estate transactions in the United States, 
though perhaps not as technologically advanced. A person wishing to 
buy real estate in Brazil would check the local newspapers, look for 
locally distributed fliers, or listen to “word of mouth.”211 As of late, 
websites also have become a source of information.212 The buyer then 
contacts a licensed real estate agent that is listed in the advertisement 
 
 202 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 203 See Sousa Santos, supra note 196, at 42. 
 204 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. 
 205 See id. at 13–14, 17; Twining, supra note 198, at 493. 
 206 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 17. In an interview with the president of a 
residents’ association, the president explained that “if there was someone buying or selling they 
had a paper, just a sheet of paper, with a header of the residents’ association saying who was 
buying and who was selling and the president signed it,” and would also enter the transaction 
“into the association[’s own] register.” Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27. 
 207 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27 (“There’s nobody that could 
walk up and say, ‘It’s mine,’ because they knew exactly who built it, who lived there, who lived 
afterwards, who their relatives were. And their neighbors and witnesses as well.”). 
 208 Id. at 26–27. 
 209 Id. at 27. 
 210 Compare PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 9–11, with id. at 11–20. 
 211 See id. at 9. While the “word of mouth” method of finding real estate may seem to be 
overly informal, it is not unusual in the United States, either, where properties are often sold 
without ever formally being on the market. Indeed, one of the authors of this Article bought 
real estate in this very manner within the past year. 
 212 Id. at 9. 
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and the transaction proceeds in much the same way as it would in the 
United States.213 Once the sale is consummated, the real estate agent 
helps in formalizing and registering the transaction. All real estate 
transactions within the formal city are registered in the cartórios which 
then serve as a repository of information on ownership of any given lot 
of land, performing roughly the same function as American county 
clerks do.214 A prospective buyer can therefore come and check to 
ensure that the seller is indeed a true owner of the land, the taxes have 
been paid, the proper permits have been obtained, etc.215 
None of this formality exists within the favelas, but parallel 
processes emulate the transactions present within the city proper. These 
processes, however, rely heavily on the leadership of the residents’ 
associations and the diligence of the elected representatives.216 Neither 
the licensed real estate agents nor the cartórios operate within the 
favelas.217 Cartórios do not register any favela real estate transactions 
“since by definition, favelas are considered irregular dwellings given that 
they were built without a construction permit, do not conform to 
building code norms and occupy the land illegally.”218 The licensed real 
estate agents do not operate within the favelas largely for the same 
reason—after all, the homes that they would be selling are not located 
on “legally-owned property.”219 Some better-located favelas do have 
informal, unlicensed real estate brokers, but even those serve mainly 
outsiders to the community.220 
Instead, a person wishing to buy or sell a house within the favela 
would rely either on “word of mouth” or post a notice on a bulletin 
board at the residents’ association’s office.221 Once the seller and the 
buyer have found each other, they complete their transaction with the 
help of the residents’ association.222 The residents’ association (though it 
keeps records of its own) will ask the seller to prove that she is the 
 
 213 See id. at 9–10. 
 214 See id. at 11; see also Mitchell, supra note 186, at 570. 
 215 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11; see also CRISTIANA MOREIRA ET AL., 
PRACTICAL LAW, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE IN BRAZIL: OVERVIEW, Westlaw (database 
updated Jan. 1, 2015); Andrew J. Dell’Olio, Public-Private Partnerships in Brazil: Opportunities 
and Risks for Investors, INT’L L. PRACTICUM, Spring 2006, at 58, 61; Buying a House or Property 
in Brazil, PALMAS TOCANTINS BRAZ. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.visitpalmas.com/archives/
buying-a-house-or-property-in-brazil. 
 216 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11–20; id. at 18 (noting that many 
presidents used to be long-time community residents, but are now appointed and controlled by 
drug lords); Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 26–28. 
 217 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11, 13–14. 
 218 Id. at 11. 
 219 Id. at 13−14. 
 220 Id. at 14. 
 221 Id. at 12. 
 222 Id. at 16−18. 
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rightful owner of the house, which may be a problem within older 
favelas where housing has been built prior to the formation of the 
residents’ associations and where the current owners who may have 
inherited the property would have no paper to show the chain of 
“title.”223 In any event, the entire transaction is complete when the seller 
and the buyer execute a transfer agreement, which is then signed by two 
witnesses who attest that they know the seller to be the rightful owner, 
and the president of the residents’ association signs and stamps the 
document.224 Similarly, the residents’ association would deal with 
registering land that is inherited or otherwise transferred after a change 
in family circumstances.225 Additionally, because technically none of the 
papers provided by the residents’ association are legal documents, as 
they purport to transfer land that is not, in the eyes of the state, legally 
occupied, the disputes over land ownership are not taken to law courts, 
but are also resolved within and by the residents’ association.226 From 
the perspective of many favela residents, the system works fairly well.227 
However, it only works where the president (and other officers) of the 
residents’ association are conscientious about their work, which is not 
always the case.228 
With the arrival of the drug gangs, the arrangement partially broke 
down. “Up until 1985, the president and officers of the Associations 
were elected by the community and accountable to the community,” but 
“[a]s the sale of drugs and arms increased, territorial control became 
 
 223 Id. at 16. However, because of the interwoven nature of the favela community, everyone 
tends to know not only who lives there but also the status of her residence, i.e., whether it is 
rented or owned. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27 (“There’s nobody that 
could walk up and say, ‘It’s mine,’ because they knew exactly who built it, who lived there, who 
lived afterwards, who their relatives were. And their neighbors and witnesses as well.”). 
 224 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 17–18, 20; see also Dell’Olio, supra note 215, at 
61 n.60. The parties to the transaction may also choose to verify the president’s signature at the 
cartório, but such verification only serves to confirm that the president’s signature is indeed a 
true signature. PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 18. The verification provided by the 
cartório does not in any way register the transaction or ownership.  
 225 As was explained to us by a favela resident, the residents’ association provides the buyer 
and a seller with a document signed and sealed by the president, and also records the 
transaction in the association’s own books. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 
26–28. Nevertheless, none of this has the same formal status as a document verified by a notary 
and recorded with the cartório. See supra note 224. 
 226 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 26–27. When asked what would 
happen should there be a dispute regarding ownership of land, a favela resident replied that 
“[p]eople would contact the [residents’] association and they would try to make it right.” Id. at 
27. Nonetheless, a prospect of violence does exist as that resident recognized by following up 
the previous explanation with suggesting that the parties to the dispute “could just fight.” Id. 
 227 See id. at 31. 
 228 See id. at 43. The interviewee cautioned that a lot depends on personal relations and 
when those deteriorate, the internal favela processes cannot work anymore. It is also a problem 
that in a number of favelas, presidents are controlled by local gangs, and therefore serve gangs’ 
interests. See id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13–14, 18. 
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very lucrative and the drug gangs began to take over the Residents’ 
Associations by driving out or killing the elected presidents.”229 The end 
result is that today, the majority of favelas “are under the control of the 
drug traffic.”230 This situation persists even though in 2009, prompted 
by the upcoming hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games, the 
Brazilian government created Police Pacification Units (Unidades de 
Polícia Pacificadora or UPPs) meant to clear out the gangs from the 
favelas.231 Generally, the UPPs have been considered to be successful in 
increasing state presence in the favelas and have contributed to rising 
land values in favelas and positive responses from residents and 
community leaders.232 Needless to say, the gang takeover of favelas 
seriously undermined the interpersonal connections and the ability of 
the residents of the favelas to engage in real estate transactions with 
some modicum of assuredness over the status of the property being 
transferred.233 Furthermore, with the gang takeover, dispute resolution 
within the favelas is often based on brute force rather than on any facts 
or sense of fairness.234 
The final piece of the puzzle that is the “on the ground” situation in 
the favelas is the Brazilian Constitution adopted during the transition to 
the democratic regime. As discussed above, the drafters of Brazil’s 
Constitution had a particular vision of the role of property rights in 
society. The Constitution of 1988 simultaneously committed the 
government to respect people’s property (including that in the favelas) 
and gave the government the authority to remove people from the 
favelas if the land was not, in the State’s opinion, being put to “rational 
and adequate use.”235 Additionally, the 1988 Constitution limited the 
ability of the government to transfer the land to private parties,236 which 
in turn made the government’s ability to formally grant the land to 
 
 229 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. 
 230 Id. at 8. 
 231 Id.; Megan Corrarino, Note, “Law Exclusion Zones”: Mega-Events as Sites of Procedural 
and Substantive Human Rights Violations, 17 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 180, 197 (2014). 
 232 Chegada da UPP à Tijuca Pode Valorizar Imóveis no Bairro em até 40%, Dizem 
Especialistas, O GLOBO (Nov. 1, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/imoveis/
chegada-da-upp-tijuca-pode-valorizar-imoveis-no-bairro-em-ate-40-dizem-especialistas-
3012765. 
 233 Enrique Desmond Arias & Corinne Davis Rodrigues, The Myth of Personal Security: 
Criminal Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas, 48 LATIN AM. POL. 
& SOC’Y 53, 71–73 (2006). 
 234 Id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 18 (“[I]n more than one case, the 
Residents’ Association was burned down and all records lost when the drug traffic took control 
from the elected President.”); Anthony, supra note 66, at 350; Interview with Favela Residents, 
supra note 145, at 44 (describing how if drug gangs wanted someone’s house, they would just 
take it, with or without minor “compensation”). 
 235 C.F. art. 186 (Braz.); see also supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 236 C.F. art. 183 (Braz.). 
DOLIN.MANTA.38.6.5 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  7:57 PM 
2017] PA RA L LE L S T AT E  2111 
 
favela residents (to the extent that the houses sit on government- rather 
than privately-owned land) problematic.237 
The conglomeration of these rules, together with the problems of 
gang violence, poverty, lack of education, etc., is what the favelas and the 
Brazilian government are facing as they attempt to regularize the legal 
status of favela properties. Over the past several decades, the Brazilian 
government attempted to create several programs that aimed to 
regularize and legalize the legal rights inside the favelas. These 
programs, however, can in many ways be described as “one step 
forward, two steps back,” because oftentimes, what they gave with one 
hand they took away with another. Additionally, local programs are 
often short-lived due to shifts in political agendas.238 For example, in 
1985 the government in Rio de Janeiro proposed a five-year plan that 
would fully incorporate favelas into the city and have them all receive 
real neighborhood services such as street paving and lighting.239 Yet the 
program never got past the initial planning because the government 
failed to give financial support to the City, and there also happened to 
be a flood a year later.240 As a result, all city funds went toward 
cleanup.241 Nonetheless, various levels of Brazilian government continue 
to attempt to regularize life in the favelas. 
The first comprehensive program known as Favela-Bairro began in 
1994 and continues to this day.242 The goal of the program was to 
integrate favelas with the city proper.243 The purpose of the program was 
“to incorporate the favelas into the city with extension of infrastructure 
and public spaces and the regularization of property ownership.”244 The 
program was meant to extend legal utilities into the favelas as well as to 
create public spaces like plazas, wider streets, and other amenities.245 In 
some sense, the project is quite successful and laudable. It succeeded in 
bringing some of the promised improvements to the few favelas where 
the program was undertaken. Nonetheless, some of these improvements 
were at the cost of depriving existing favela residents of their homes 
(and relocating them elsewhere, though usually within the same favela). 
In the favela of Santa Marta, for example, the City government planned 
 
 237 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 44–45 (discussing how there are 
limits on whom the federal government can transfer land to); see also Smith, supra note 148, at 
34–35. 
 238 See, e.g., PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 8, 24, 30–31. 
 239 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 274. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 275; PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26. 
 243 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 275; PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26. 
 244 White, supra note 54, at 320. 
 245 See Smith, supra note 148, at 24. 
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and attempted “a complete urbanization project . . . involv[ing] two lifts, 
one on each side of the favela, the opening of streets for cars, and 
investment in the houses.”246 This was a multi-purpose, ambitious 
project. It was supposed 
to invest in the houses that were extremely full, so they’re wooden 
houses and they also have a quite precarious situation, for example 
the people that live in basements in the favela. And then the other 
point would be to create more ventilation, more room for air in parts 
of the favela where . . . there’s no air running around. . . . And then 
the third point that they were going to pass on was in the drainage 
system . . . .247 
Although the project did not live up to its original plans, some 
improvements were made.248 Yet, as a result, the government had “to 
relocate [the affected] famil[ies] but [they were] promised that they 
[would] stay in the favela.”249 And the number of families removed and 
relocated is significant. By some estimates, in Santa Marta alone, 100 
families would have had to be relocated in 2004, but because the project 
was not completed, and the favela continued to grow, today, if the 
government were to complete the project as initially planned, the 
number of families subject to relocation would be close to 300.250 
Furthermore, the Favela-Bairro program suffers from two 
additional and interwoven problems. First, “[d]espite the construction 
of paved plazas at the entrance to many of the participating favelas, no 
one is in doubt as to where the formal city (called the asfalto or paved 
city) ends and the informal city (called the morro or hillside) begins.”251 
This clear delineation allows for the favelas to “remain highly 
stigmatized territories of exclusion,” with the “discrimination against 
favela residents [exceeding that] against dark-skinned people, women, 
migrants from rural areas or any other” group.252 It is not surprising that 
the line between the favelas and the city proper remains as bright as 
ever.253 One of the reasons is that the various improvement projects are 
not only too small in scale, but are also carried out in fits and starts.254 
The problem is that the implementation of various plans is dependent 
 
 246 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 22. 
 247 Id. at 24. 
 248 Id. As one resident put it “a lot was done but we still have just a little bit of each problem. 
They didn’t solve any of them completely. That’s the main problem of all organization projects 
in the favelas is really that they’re never complete, they always get interrupted.” Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See id. 
 254 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 24. 
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on the political will of elected officials. Thus, for example in Santa Marta 
“the mayor [who negotiated the improvement project with the favela 
residents] lost the election and the new mayor came and he was [in] 
opposition. And that was the end of that agreement.”255 Luckily, in that 
case the State government took responsibility of the project and saw to it 
that it was not completely abandoned.256 Nonetheless, the initial plan to 
fully integrate Santa Marta into the city, much like other Favela-Bairro 
plans, did not succeed.257 
To address these disparities, in 2010, Rio authorities expanded 
Favela-Bairro and named the expansion Morar Carioca (which roughly 
translates to “to live as someone from Rio de Janeiro”).258 The goal 
remained the same—to re-urbanize and socially integrate all of the city’s 
favelas by 2020,259 by providing housing units, infrastructure, 
landscaping, improvement of sanitation systems, implementation of 
leisure and educational programs, and more.260 Though formally an 
extension of the Favela-Bairro program, Morar Carioca was conceived 
as the most ambitious that Rio de Janeiro has seen and as a key part of 
the legacy of the 2016 Olympics.261 When field research took place in 
2012, architects and urban planners felt a need for quick action and 
experienced excitement.262 They hoped that the Morar Carioca model 
would even out the differences in the type of urban infrastructure and 
level of service provision various dwellers experienced.263 In December 
2010, the outcome of the Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB) design 
contest was released and forty architecture firms were chosen to mediate 
 
 255 Id. at 23. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. In describing the present-day state of affairs, the resident contrasted Santa Marta with 
the “formal city” thus:  
[I]n the formal city, you have order and you have to respect it, and here nobody is 
checking it. So if the state played the same role of checking in the favela as they check 
in the formal city then you prevent that, but the problem is the state only comes to 
the favela to reprimand or to remove people. They are not doing the natural control, 
ordering that they do in the formal city. 
Id. at 25–26. 
 258 See Kate Steiker-Ginzberg, Morar Carioca: The Dismantling of a Dream Favela 
Upgrading Program, RIOONWATCH (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=17687. 
 259 Paula Alvarado, The Urbanization of Rio de Janeiro’s Slums, a Model for Sustainable 
Development, TREEHUGGER (June 12, 2012), https://www.treehugger.com/urban-design/the-
urbanization-of-rio-de-janeiro-s-slums-a-model-for-sustainable-development.html; Helen 
Walters, Four Commandments for Cities of the Future: Eduardo Paes at TED2012, TEDBLOG 
(Feb. 29, 2012, 9:49 PM), http://blog.ted.com/four-commandments-for-cities-of-the-future-
eduardo-paes-at-ted2012. 
 260 See Steiker-Ginzberg, supra note 258. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
DOLIN.MANTA.38.6.5 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  7:57 PM 
2114 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:2083 
 
in specific favela “groupings.”264 “The first group of eleven firms were 
contracted in June 2012 and began performing qualitative diagnostics in 
the communities with the support of iBase,” a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) that was employed by the Municipal Secretary of 
Housing (SMH) “to hold participatory meetings and collect residents’ 
demands.”265 The City, however, “cut iBase’s contract in January 2013, 
financially dismantling the projects.”266 Despite the fact that individual 
parts of the project are still in progress, the plan to integrate the favelas 
within the context of the Olympics has faded because both the funding 
and the participatory structures targeted a completion goal of 2016.267 
When Mayor Eduardo Paes “was questioned about Morar Carioca at an 
event in 2013, he cited lack of financial resources.”268 Architects and 
urban planners blame a shift in political agendas, and the way that 
politicians balanced different priorities and competing interests that 
resulted in the dismantling of the program.269 
The next program meant to help the residents of the favelas, known 
as Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My Home, My Life), is equally a mixed 
bag. The goal of the program is to allow poor working families to obtain 
credit to buy a home.270 However, the property for which a mortgage 
can be obtained “must be formally registered with legal land title and 
must show proof of paying property taxes.”271 Almost definitionally, this 
requirement excludes homes within favelas as those homes are not 
“formally registered with legal land title,” and often cannot “show proof 
of paying property taxes.”272 Furthermore, the mortgage amount is 
rather modest, meaning that the only non-favela housing that would 
qualify would be on the city’s outskirts far from their work.273 Thus, 
favela residents (especially of those favelas that are centrally located) are 
loath to trade their illegal, convenient abode for a legal, very 
inconvenient one.274 
 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id.; see also Stefan Johnson, Providência’s Cable Car Launch: Urban Mobility or Tourism?, 
RIOONWATCH (July 1, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=16464. 
 268 Steiker-Ginzberg, supra note 258. 
 269 Id. 
 270 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at 16. 
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B.     Toward Individual Titling and Ownership 
All of this leads to the discussion of the programs aimed at 
empowering residents of the favelas to improve their own lot by giving 
them ownership rights to their houses and the land on which the houses 
stand. The idea is that once acquired, such rights would be subject to 
traditional market forces and not be dependent on the political winds or 
the necessity to trade convenience for legalization. This Section will 
attempt to describe these efforts, as well as the barriers to the realization 
of the program. 
The first efforts to provide favela residents with title to their land 
actually began quite early. In 1984, during the time of transition from 
military to civilian rule, Leonel Brizola, the then-governor of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro, announced the Cada Familia, Um Lote (A Plot for Every 
Family) program.275 As conceived, the program was quite ambitious. 
The original plan involved titling 400,000 lots, improving the 
infrastructure of another 400,000, and creating 200,000 new lots to 
account for the in-country immigration into Rio.276 The final outcome 
of the program, which ran for only three years, was much more modest, 
with only 23,000 lots being transferred into private ownership.277 
However, the program did bequeath Brazil an important innovation. As 
part of the Cada Familia, Um Lote, the government created a semi-
public entity to which publicly held land could be transferred consistent 
with the law on alienation of public land.278 This entity, known by its 
Portuguese acronym CEHAB-RJ, continues to exist and is now a 
nominal title-holder for vast swaths of land.279 These holdings affect 
how today’s titling process proceeds. 
The current land titling process is best illustrated by the example of 
the Cantagalo Project, named after an eponymous favela near the 
upscale neighborhoods of Ipanema and Copacabana.280 While there are 
other programs, the Cantagalo Project is illustrative of both the process 
for title regularization and the difficulties that arise in the course of this 
endeavor. 
 
 275 Smith, supra note 148, at 27. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 271; see, e.g., Smith, supra note 148, at 29–30 (“The 
title investigation revealed that while much of the land was held by the state, 18,505m2 was held 
by CEHAB, a semi-public company created as part of the Cada Familia, Um Lote discussed 
above to administer the transfer of land occupied by favelas to the residents of the communities 
themselves.”). 
 280 Smith, supra note 148, at 29. 
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The Cantagalo Project began in 2008 with attorneys acting on 
behalf of the entire community of Cantagalo filing a usucapião (an 
equivalent to adverse possession) claim against CEHAB-RJ, which holds 
a large portion of the land on which this particular favela sits.281 Under 
the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, “a possessor who can demonstrate 
uninterrupted, uncontested possession of land for a period of time [can] 
gain title to that land.”282 Usually, for possessors who used the land for 
residential purposes and believed themselves to be true owners of the 
land in question, the period is five years.283 What is particularly 
interesting is that the Brazilian adverse possession process (the 
usucapião) can be invoked not just by individuals, but also by groups 
and communities.284 This is what happened at the first stage of the 
Cantagalo Project—the Cantagalo favela asserted adverse possession 
over the land on which it sat as a community rather than as individual 
land occupiers.285 
As in the United States, the Brazilian adverse possession process is 
a judicial one.286 To begin the process, the land in question must be 
defined.287 This is where proceeding as a community makes things 
easier, but where ultimately giving title to a particular individual or 
family becomes quite complicated.288 In the Cantagalo favela, the 
residents’ association, working together with Instituto Atlântico (a non-
profit public policy organization) secured the services of a pro bono 
attorney who “conducted a topographical analysis of the community, a 
formal census of all community members, and an investigation to 
identify the actual title holders of the lands occupied by the 
community.”289 This was by no means a small undertaking. Finally, with 
the results in hand, in 2009 the case was brought before a Brazilian 
court.290 It is important to observe that the defendant in the case was 
CEHAB-RJ, rather than the State or a private party.291 Having CEHAB-
RJ—an entity established decades earlier with the specific mandate to 
transfer title to the favela residents—in many ways made all the 
 
 281 Id. at 28. 
 282 Id. at 30. See generally C.F. arts. 183, 191 (Braz.) (outlining the procedures and 
requirements for establishing usucapião). 
 283 See discussion supra notes 80–100. 
 284 Smith, supra note 148, at 32. 
 285 Id. at 32–33. 
 286 See Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, Informal Land Subdivision and Real Estate 
Regularization: A Comparative Study Between Colombia and Brazil, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 315, 321−22 (2009); Smith, supra note 148, at 30. 
 287 See Smith, supra note 148, at 36. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. at 29. 
 290 Id. at 30. 
 291 Id. at 29−30. 
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difference.292 The Brazilian Constitution denies anyone the ability to 
adversely possess as against the government293—a doctrine that is also 
present in American law.294 Thus, had the land in the Cantagalo favela 
been owned by the State, it may have been impossible to bring the 
action to acquire possession.295 Had the land been owned by a private 
party, there may well have been a more contentious litigation process. 
But with the land owned by CEHAB-RJ, and taking into account that 
the residents’ association conducted extensive preliminary negotiations 
and consultations before filing suit to essentially quiet title, the suit 
proceeded rather smoothly and without much adversity,296 if still at 
glacial pace.297 
The court proved receptive to the claims by the residents’ 
association,298 though the fact that there still does not appear to be a 
final judgment seven years later is indicative of the difficulty of the 
process.299 However, as it turned out, not all land on which the favela 
stands was owned by CEHAB-RJ.300 Some land was still owned by the 
State itself,301 and therefore was not included in the usucapião process.302 
At the same time, there is an ability to obtain a “concession” (rather 
than full title) “that grants the possessor limited rights of use and 
occupation.”303 To obtain such a concessionary right, the applicant must 
show 1) “five-year[s of] uninterrupted and uncontested possession or 
urban land”; 2) that the applicant is an “individual or individuals of low 
income”; 3) “use of land for residential purposes”; and 4) “possession of 
no other rural or urban properties.”304 Despite the alienability of 
concessionary title, including through mortgage,305 there are several 
limitations. First, the concession can only be transferred to another 
person meeting the income restrictions.306 Second, the holder of a 
 
 292 Id. at 28−30, 33. 
 293 C.F. art. 183 (Braz.). 
 294 See generally Walter Quentin Impert, Comment, Whose Land Is It Anyway?: It’s Time to 
Reconsider Sovereign Immunity from Adverse Possession, 49 UCLA L. REV. 447 (2001). 
 295 See Smith, supra note 148, at 32. See generally C.F. art. 183 (Braz.) (“Public real estate 
shall not be acquired by prescription.”). 
 296 Smith, supra note 148, at 29. 
 297 The case was initially filed in 2009, yet by 2016, only forty-four families had received title. 
See Project Cantagalo: Overview, INSTITUTO ATLÂNTICO, http://www.atlantico.org.br/en/
projetos/cantagalo/apresentacao (last visited July 26, 2016). 
 298 Smith, supra note 148, at 30, 33–34. 
 299 See supra note 297. 
 300 Smith, supra note 148, at 29. 
 301 Id. 
 302 See id. at 31–33. 
 303 Id. at 32. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57–58. 
DOLIN.MANTA.38.6.5 (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2017  7:57 PM 
2118 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:2083 
 
concessionary title can only use it as his own residence.307 On the other 
hand, the concessionary title may be easier to obtain as it does not 
require a full-blown judicial process, but rather somewhat abbreviated 
administrative procedures.308 Nonetheless, the administrative process 
has its own limitations. As the president of one of the residents’ 
associations explained during a conversation, before invoking the 
administrative process, the claimants 
have to do topography and all the land research, not just who the 
owner is but all the research that it’s not an area of risk, if it’s got 
minimum infrastructure, and the law terms that the land has to have 
at least two types of minimum infrastructure, so streets, sewage, 
public lighting, and water supply.309 
That is why favelas that benefited from the Favela-Bairro program 
discussed above, which widened streets and improved the 
infrastructure,310 are in a better position to succeed in the administrative 
process than the ones where the level of squalor is higher.311 
It should also be noted that, at least in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 
the Constitution has been amended to allow the use of the shorter 
administrative process to seek land donation (rather than 
concession).312 Unlike adverse possession judicial actions, however, the 
donation through the administrative procedure is a negotiated process 
where the government has to agree to donate and can impose conditions 
on the donation.313 The recourse to these administrative proceedings is 
the second phase of the Cantagalo Project.314 
The Cantagalo Project illuminates both the opportunities to 
achieve land regularization and the roadblocks on the way to that goal. 
In terms of opportunities, as already mentioned, the Cantagalo Project 
spurred the government of Rio de Janeiro not only to begin the land 
transfer process, but also to change the law to allow for quicker and 
easier procedures.315 The Cantagalo Project has also been emulated in 
 
 307 Smith, supra note 148, at 33. 
 308 Id. at 28, 34−35; Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57–63. 
 309 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 60. 
 310 See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text. 
 311 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 19 (discussing how the Favela-Bairro 
program, though it ended up being little help in terms of obtaining full title, allowed residents 
to obtain a “permit of occupancy”); id. at 15 (“The favelas which were upgraded by the Favela-
Bairro Program . . . have the lowest risk of removal.”). 
 312 Smith, supra note 148, at 34–35; Project Cantagalo: Finalized Stages, INSTITUTO 
ATLÂNTICO, http://www.atlantico.org.br/en/projetos/cantagalo/etapas-concluidas (last visited 
July 26, 2016). 
 313 UN-HABITAT, LAND TENURE, HOUSING RIGHTS AND GENDER IN BRAZIL 43–44 (2005); 
Smith, supra note 148, at 35. 
 314 Smith, supra note 148, at 28. 
 315 Id. at 34. 
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other favelas, with residents and/or residents’ associations seeking title 
to the land on which their homes sit.316 At the same time, the Cantagalo 
Project laid bare the Herculean scope of the effort. As of the day of this 
writing in 2017 the adverse possession case that began in 2008 has yet to 
reach final judgment.317 Furthermore, thus far only forty-four out of 
over 9000 residents have received title to their land.318 And all of this 
was under the most favorable of conditions. The Cantagalo Project is 
somewhat unique in that it 
was nurtured and supported by private entities in the formal 
sector. . . . [T]he initial impetus of the project was a collaboration 
between the residents’ association of Cantagalo with the Instituto 
Atlântico and representatives from the wealthy neighborhood of 
Ipanema. The influence of the latter two groups and their ability to 
marshal resources cannot be underestimated nor assumed as a given 
in future projects.319 
The reason why the financial support is so critical to the 
regularization procedure stems from the very first requirement for the 
process to begin. Before any judicial or administrative claims can be 
filed, the property in question must be surveyed, the residents and their 
length of stay ascertained, plots mapped, and any possible disputes 
between residents laying claim to the same land resolved.320 The costs of 
such an undertaking for every favela and every resident are enormous.321 
Absent significant infusion of funds from the State or private entities, it 
is unlikely that significant progress could be made.322 
The lack of affordable counsel to represent the favela residents and 
the backlogs in the judicial system are additional significant problems 
that greatly slow down the process of regularization.323 Although there 
have been some improvements on this front, the backlog continues to 
stretch back years.324 
 
 316 See id. at 35; supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 317 See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text. 
 318 See Smith, supra note 148, at 29 (noting that the Cantagalo favela has a population of 
9000 residents); supra note 297. 
 319 Smith, supra note 148, at 37. 
 320 Id. at 36. 
 321 Id. 
 322 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 58 (“[Favela residents and 
communities] always had to rely on the work of the public lawyers and the public lawyers are 
already overloaded. . . . [R]esearch . . . shows that 87% of all lawsuits in Rio rely on the works of 
these public lawyers, so with that the process was very slow.”); cf. Smith, supra note 148, at 37. 
 323 Smith, supra note 148, at 36–37. 
 324 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 12 (“The city office of the Attorney General is 
in charge of these [regularization] cases, and has an interminable backlog of pending cases. 
There is no end in sight until a new system is put into place. So far, that has not happened even 
with the ambitious squatter upgrading program, Favela-Bairro.”); Interview with Favela 
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Even if one were to consider only collective regularization rather 
than individual titling, the Cantagalo favela is better situated than many 
of its counterparts. This particular favela has the advantage of having 
been “pacified” by the UPP.325 This means that the residents’ association 
was in charge and could represent residents’ best interests in its 
interactions with CEHAB-RJ and the government. The same cannot be 
said for other favelas that remain gang-controlled.326 Even if those 
favelas were to begin the same process, it is unlikely that the interaction 
with the government and other officials would be nearly as fruitful as 
they were in Cantagalo’s case.327 
Finally, it should be observed that the laws undergirding the 
regularization process also tend to limit it. As mentioned above, 
oftentimes a number of conditions must be satisfied for individuals to 
obtain title from the government.328 One of those conditions is that the 
land in question be used for residential purposes only, which is not the 
case for all land in the favelas. 
In some instances an individual will acquire informal title to a 
number of properties within a favela and will rent out the properties 
as an informal, off-site “landlord.” More frequent is the case in which 
an occupying family rents out part of their house or sells the right for 
another family to occupy and build on their roof.329 
In these situations, the title may be transferred to the favela 
community, but perhaps not to the individual.330 This in turn limits the 
full alienability of land.331 Similarly, downstream transfers may be 
constrained to individuals within a certain income level.332 Such 
restrictions are not uncommon in cities such as New York City,333 which 
 
Residents, supra note 145, at 2 (noting that at best it takes six months to process a single claim, 
whereas thousands of people are waiting). 
 325 Smith, supra note 148, at 29. 
 326 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13 (“Today, the majority of favelas are 
under the control of the drug traffic.”). 
 327 See Smith, supra note 148, at 38 (discussing unique features of the Cantagalo favela). 
 328 See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text. 
 329 Smith, supra note 148, at 37 (citation omitted). 
 330 Compare id. at 34 (noting that the administrative claim can be brought collectively), with 
id. at 37−38 (discussing limitations to acquisitions of land by someone who rents rather than 
lives on it). 
 331 See id. at 33. 
 332 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 58. 
 333 See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 576(1)(b) (McKinney 2015) (limiting purchase of 
certain properties to “persons or families whose probable aggregate annual income does not 
exceed six times the rental”). 
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also limits the alienability and marketability of the land,334 making it 
potentially not worth it for people to regularize their possessions. 
C.     Residents’ Concerns About Regularization 
Before turning to the next Part of this Article, two additional 
observations about the current state of affairs in the regularization 
efforts should be made. First, during our interviews with the residents of 
the favelas, it became quite evident that the complexity of the 
regularization process is confusing to them and that they are not certain 
of what rights they would acquire at any given stage of the process. The 
clearest example of this was the confusion over two types of documents 
that the residents can acquire. One is referred to as a posse and another 
one is escritura. The escritura is a formal deed, and the rights associated 
with it are the same as with any deed on any piece of property within the 
city proper.335 The posse, on the other hand, is much more amorphous 
or is at least perceived as such. The posse is a document that recognizes 
the holder’s tenure on land.336 The tenure recognition is important for 
the adverse possession five-year clock to begin ticking.337 Perceptions of 
the posse, however, vary wildly between different favela residents. Thus, 
during one conversation a favela resident, when asked “What has 
changed for the people who have obtained posse?,” replied: “[N]othing. 
Because . . . what makes [a difference] is when you have the [escritura], 
so when you have the posse nothing has changed.”338 Another resident 
said that “posse doesn’t have a legal meaning.”339 On the other hand, 
another resident explained that posse is indeed a legal document that 
 
 334 See Michelle Higgins, Bargains with a ‘but’: Affordable New York Apartments with a 
Catch, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/realestate/affordable-
new-york-apartments-with-a-catch.html (“[S]ome of the city’s most affordable apartments 
[are] struggling to find buyers . . . because they belong to a small and quirky breed of co-op that 
requires buyers to meet income caps . . . .”). 
 335 Jose Santiago, The Closing Process in Brazil, GRINGOES, http://www.gringoes.com/the-
closing-process-in-brazil (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). The escritura is important because, as one 
of the favela residents stated, “when you have the escritura, if you want to get your house better, 
do constructions, you can . . . [g]et a loan from the bank.” Interview with Favela Residents, 
supra note 145, at 7. Furthermore, if the government were to evict an escritura holder using its 
eminent domain powers, the owner who has an escritura “will be paid by the land and the 
house. And, if they don’t have the escritura, they just get money from the house.” Id. 
 336 According to one resident’s understanding of the process: “When you see somebody 
living like the owner then you can say that this person has the posse,” but not the right to the 
title. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 56. 
 337 See discussion supra notes 81–100. 
 338 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 6. 
 339 Id. at 32. 
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confirms a concessionary title from the government.340 He explained 
that posse came into being in the 1980s “because the law still says that 
public land could not be donated to private people,” and to comply with 
that formality, “[the government] started the whole posse title,” which 
was in turn “valid for 99 years.”341 
It appears that the mass confusion over the meaning and value of 
the posse title stems from the different rules for regularizing land title 
depending on who happens to be the owner of record and on the rather 
Byzantine and interminable process of regularization. For non-
government land, it seems that posse is indeed an intermediate step 
toward full title embodied by the escritura.342 The posse proves that the 
person holding it is in possession of the land described in the document 
and begins the ticking of the clock on the five-year adverse possession 
statute of limitations, but does not in and of itself confer the right of 
ownership.343 Conversely, when the land in question is government 
owned, escritura cannot be obtained, because government land cannot 
be transferred to private ownership344 (or at least could not be until the 
previously discussed state constitutional amendment which permits 
donation, but not adverse possession345). Thus, the posse serves a 
function of a title for the concessionary transfer.346 The confusion, 
however caused, results in the favela residents losing faith in the 
regularization process. Thus, one resident commented that though “an 
NGO actually come[s] and do[es] the surveys and all the work and all 
the documents, but people didn’t even bother picking up the posse 
documents,” choosing to rely instead on the informal documents 
received from the residents’ association.347 Such attitudes present a 
significant barrier to regularization of ownership in the favelas, but they 
may abate if the procedures become faster, more transparent, and more 
understandable to the average layperson. 
 
 340 Id. at 43–44; see also Brazil Property Guide: Key Facts and Markets, NUWIRE INV. (Dec. 
19, 2008), http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/brazil-property-guide-key-facts-and-markets. 
 341 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 41, 43. 
 342 Id. at 3–4, 6, 32. 
 343 Id. at 66–67 (explaining that it takes a long time to acquire documents needed to obtain 
posse and then once posse is in hand, the five-year clock for adverse possession, and ultimately 
escritura begins ticking). However, even when the five years are up, there may still be a 
protracted legal process to get the land by adverse possession. See supra notes 297−99, 323−24 
and accompanying text. 
 344 C.F. art. 183 (Braz.). 
 345 See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 346 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57, 83 (explaining that under the 
concessionary regime, no escritura is ever granted, and posse “title” is evidence of concession); 
see also Smith, supra note 148, at 32 (noting that “a government concession . . . grants the 
possessor limited rights of use and occupation,” rather than title). 
 347 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 31. 
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The second observation that we made was the unease of a number 
of favela residents with regularization as a whole, aside from the 
particular procedures to achieve it.348 The concerns were two-fold. First, 
the residents worried about the gentrification of the favelas, especially 
those located in the central and desirable areas of Rio.349 They 
understand that once individuals have proper registerable title to their 
land, they would no longer be limited to selling within the favela 
community and with the approval of the residents’ association.350 
Instead, the newly titled individuals would be able to sell to anyone able 
and willing to pay the market price for the lot.351 If such a practice 
becomes widespread, some residents believe that the very people whom 
the regularization process was supposed to help would end up priced 
out of their own neighborhoods and the favela problem would simply be 
pushed to a new location, with the cycle repeating itself.352 The second 
concern is that regularization would also bring with it new obligations, 
including paying real estate taxes353 and obeying the various building 
codes.354 
While there is not necessarily objection to the payment of taxes as 
such, much depends on where a given favela is located. For example, as 
one of our interviewees observed, the favela of “Santa Marta is in the 
south of the city”—“the most expensive part of the city”—and, unless 
special designations are made, the tax imposed on the residents of Santa 
Marta may become unaffordable.355 Similarly, the residents are 
concerned that the building codes and permits currently inapplicable to 
favelas will start operating with full force as part of the regularization 
process.356 The problem is that although such codes apply in the city 
 
 348 Id. at 10–11 (expressing the concern that “the biggest problem in terms of regularization 
is gentrification” since “once you have the property . . . anybody of the city can buy your area”); 
Smith, supra note 148, at 38 (noting that “[t]here may also be elements within the favelas which 
oppose formal titling” for various—including nefarious—reasons). 
 349 See Jo Griffin, Olympic Exclusion Zone: The Gentrification of a Rio Favela, GUARDIAN 
(June 15, 2016, 6:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jun/15/rio-olympics-
exclusion-zone-gentrification-favela-babilonia. 
 350 See generally Christopher Gaffney, The Blind Hand of the Market, GEOSTADIA (May 2, 
2014, 12:39 PM), http://geostadia.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-blind-hand-of-market.html. 
 351 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 11 (“[S]peculators are the first 
ones that come and buy the land.”). 
 352 See Pindell, supra note 18, at 457; Smith, supra note 148, at 25−27. 
 353 See Marc R. Poirier, Brazilian Regularization of Title in Light of Moradia, Compared to 
the United States Understandings of Homeownership and Homelessness, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 259, 268 (2013). 
 354 See Perlman, Metamorphosis, supra note 189, at 176 (“Rio’s favela residents are mostly 
opposed to regularization of land titles. They do not want to pay property taxes or submit to 
building codes . . . .”). 
 355 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 33. 
 356 Id. at 33–34. 
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proper, the wealthier residents of the city can always find a way (legal or 
not quite) to avoid particularly troublesome restrictions or to secure the 
necessary permits.357 The residents of favelas, with their lack of funds, 
are not so fortunate.358 Thus, it may be that the regularization will 
disadvantage the newly minted formal owners by limiting their current 
ability to expand or renovate their housing. 
In short, the regularization process, though mostly welcomed by 
the residents of the favelas, is not viewed as an unalloyed good, and the 
favela residents do retain a number of concerns that also tend to retard 
the process of regularization. 
IV.     PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TITLE 
A.     Removals for Large-Scale Sports Events 
This Section describes how, while the informal property system in 
the favelas may have worked for many intents and purposes, the 
Brazilian government was able to seize land without much ado from the 
many title-less residents when the government wanted to build large-
scale athletic facilities for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. In 
the past decade, Brazilian officials have devoted significant resources to 
cinching lucrative relationships with global athletic mega-events.359 In 
an effort to further Brazil’s newfound economic dexterity and 
cosmopolitan standing, Rio de Janeiro has become the de facto epicenter 
of ambitious projects with global organizations like FIFA and the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC).360 Brazil’s host city is 
following the global trend of furthering international elite interests to 
capitalize on the highly profitable sponsor influx and global spotlight.361 
The actions taken by Brazilian officials to revamp city infrastructure in 
preparation for these large-scale events expose the complete lack of 
recognition of the property rights of thousands of Brazilian favela 
residents.362 
 
 357 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 21. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Corrarino, supra note 231, at 190–92. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. at 185–86. 
 362 Stefan Norgaard, Why the Olympics and Other Major Sporting Events Usually Increase 
Inequality in the Host City, FORDFOUNDATION (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.fordfoundation.org/
ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/why-the-olympics-and-other-major-sporting-events-usually-
increase-inequality-in-the-host-city; Adam Talbot, Opinion, Rio 2016: Who Stands to Benefit 
from a Successful Olympics?, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2016, 5:02 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
rio-2016-who-stands-benefit-successful-olympics-453094. 
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The organization of global sporting events, such as the Olympics 
and World Cup, have an extensive history of exclusively benefitting the 
elite and well-connected upper class of the host country.363 In Brazil, the 
2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics have been used pretextually for 
Brazilian officials to initiate a “social cleansing” of prominent Rio de 
Janeiro properties.364 As substantial public investment funnels into new 
infrastructure put in place for these major events, property prices of the 
surrounding areas surge in response.365 
Human Rights Advisor of Amnesty International Brazil, Renata 
Neder, suggested that the process of gentrification taking place 
throughout Rio de Janeiro in anticipation of the 2014 World Cup and 
2016 Olympics reveals how the government sees the city: “[I]t is no 
longer a place for residents, but as a business to sell to foreign investors. 
That’s what the World Cup is about.”366 The opportunities for business 
development in the wake of hosting a mega event are unprecedented in 
terms of foreign interest in adjacent properties.367 Brazil has capitalized 
upon the lucrative, global limelight with utter disregard for the human 
rights of its most vulnerable and indigent population.368 
As Rio de Janeiro infrastructure was put into place in preparation 
for the World Cup and Olympics, the city’s real estate prices 
skyrocketed.369 The police pacification process, while improving safety, 
also contributed to rising prices. For example, Vidigal was one of Rio’s 
most notorious favelas before the City jailed many of the drug 
traffickers previously in charge.370 Real estate advocacy groups estimate 
that within seventy-two hours of the police taking control of Vidigal, the 
neighboring property prices rose by fifty percent, effectively pricing out 
thousands of native families in the process.371 The exodus of the original 
poorer residents made the new wave of investor- and owner-occupied 
real estate transactions possible. While some residents asserted that the 
safer environment was due to the increased police presence in the 
 
 363 See Norgaard, supra note 362; Talbot, supra note 362. 
 364 Owen Gibson & Jonathan Watts, World Cup: Rio Favelas Being ‘Socially Cleansed’ in 
Runup to Sporting Events, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013, 12:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/dec/05/world-cup-favelas-socially-cleansed-olympics. 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. 
 367 Id. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Francesca Steele, Brazil Property: Buyers Target Homes in Rio’s ‘Pacified’ Favelas, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5a4c57ea-1612-11e3-a57d-00144fea
bdc0.html. 
 370 Nick Boulos, A Fresh Perspective on Rio from Its Most Notorious Favela, TELEGRAPH 
(Aug. 4, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/south-america/brazil/
articles/a-fresh-perspective-on-rio-from-one-of-its-most-notorious-favelas. 
 371 Steele, supra note 369. 
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favelas, contentious property ownership disputes remained 
commonplace.372 
In 2013, a local resident in the Vidigal area, Andreas Wieland, 
“won a dispute over his ownership” of a popular Vidigal nightclub, 
which he had bought in 2009 for $10,000.373 Upon establishing his 
ownership, he was promptly offered over $300,000 to sell it.374 The 
effects of the World Cup and Olympic planning exacerbated an already 
precarious dichotomy of economic disparity and social development. 
The cost of living rose as a result of Rio’s role as host city to these major 
events.375 While the construction boom intended to improve the urban 
mobility crisis of Rio, the income inequality and construction issues 
only compounded it.376 
While Brazilian officials offered safety concerns for the basis of the 
forced evictions, this pretense falls flat as the actions taken by the 
Brazilian officials revealed the true motivation. In defense of the City’s 
widespread demolition of thousands of longstanding housing structures 
for the most disenfranchised citizens, Rio de Janeiro’s housing secretary, 
Jorge Bittar, said the demolition was part of a multi-million dollar 
project to transform the area developed for the World Cup.377 Bittar 
justified the systematic demolitions as necessary to develop the land into 
the epicenter of the World Cup festivities.378 While the areas marked for 
demolition lacked basic infrastructure, such as running water, 
electricity, or school systems, the Rio de Janeiro housing authorities 
prioritized the construction of lavish cultural centers, tree-lined plazas, 
and cinemas.379 Bittar recognized that the areas targeted for demolition 
were very poor communities, but he blindly suggested that the forced 
removals experienced by these residents were meant to offer the affected 
families dignity.380 
Despite the noble reasoning that Rio de Janeiro authorities offered 
for the forced removals, the ensuing rampant destruction devastated the 
 
 372 Id. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Vincent Bevins, Ipanema Has It All, Including Skyrocketing City Home Prices, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/greathomesanddestinations/20iht-reipan
ema20.html. 
 376 Paula Daibert, Brazil’s Evicted ‘Won’t Celebrate World Cup’, ALJAZEERA (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/brazil-evicted-won-celebrate-world-cup-
201452012437552695.html. 
 377 Tom Phillips, Rio World Cup Demolitions Leave Favela Families Trapped in Ghost Town, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/favela-
ghost-town-rio-world-cup. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
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livelihood of an entire sub-culture.381 Favela residents reported waking 
up to the demolition of their community without any prior indication, 
resulting in thousands of residents living amongst the rubble of their 
former communities.382 When asked why city-sponsored demolition 
began in favelas still inhabited, Bittar blamed a construction company 
for not finishing new housing in time for the displaced inhabitants to 
relocate.383 While Rio de Janeiro’s government claimed that the 
demolitions were necessary to rectify the unsafe living conditions of 
favela residents, children were left to live and play amid the wreckage 
that used to be their functioning community.384 
The Rio de Janeiro government undertook initial demolitions in 
November 2010 to transform the area designated to become a parking 
lot for the Maracanã Stadium.385 Favela do Metrô, a Rio de Janeiro 
community that was home to over 700 families, faced the brunt of the 
lofty development goals of the City.386 Seasonal workers, who eventually 
established their own livelihoods and businesses in the favela, 
constructed Favela do Metrô in the late 1970s.387 By 2010, Favela do 
Metrô was a self-governing community comprised of 126 small family 
businesses.388 It was common for several generations to live in one 
structure within the favela, with that one structure providing not only 
shelter, but also the livelihood for the entire family.389 A family would 
run a small business out of the first floor of its dwelling, offering income 
security and housing for future generations. In a community with slight 
public infrastructure, a family’s hand-constructed shelter was often the 
only means to endure systemic poverty. 
As the City began unannounced and sporadic rounds of 
demolitions throughout Favela do Metrô, living conditions 
disintegrated from the prior self-governed community.390 Causing 
widespread “panic and despair,” the City began demolition on inhabited 
 
 381 See NAT’L COALITION OF LOCAL COMMS. FOR A PEOPLE’S WORLD CUP & OLYMPICS, 
MEGA-EVENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BRAZIL 13–14 (2012), http://
www.conectas.org/arquivos-site/Sumario_eng%20(1).pdf. 
 382 Id. 
 383 Phillips, supra note 377. 
 384 Id. 
 385 Elena Hodges, The World Cup Is Underway. What Has Become of Favela do Metrô?, 
RIOONWATCH (June 21, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=16094l; Phillips, supra note 377. 
 386 Hodges, supra note 385. 
 387 Phillips, supra note 377. 
 388 Hodges, supra note 385. 
 389 See Susie Seefelt Lesieutre, From Favela to Bairro: Rio’s Neighborhoods in Transition, 
DRCLAS NEWS (David Rockefeller Ctr. for Latin Am. Studies, Harvard Univ., Boston, Mass.), 
Winter 2001, at 53, 53 (“Many times these favelas are home to generations of the same family. 
Relocating them disrupts their already adverse lives, removing them from longstanding social 
ties and jobs.”). 
 390 Hodges, supra note 385. 
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homes, “some with the occupants’ belongings still inside.”391 A fraction 
of the most vulnerable residents were relocated to other housing over 
forty miles away in Cosmos, West Zone.392 Even those lucky enough to 
accept resettlement offers faced extreme hardships, as the isolated 
relocations offered few job prospects.393 Because the City failed to 
manage matters properly and displayed significant negligence, drug 
users and criminal enterprises flocked to the half-demolished, 
abandoned structures, followed by problems with mosquitos carrying 
dengue as well as with rats.394 Shortly thereafter, the City halted all 
garbage disposal services throughout Favela do Metrô, worsening the 
conditions for the remaining residents.395 As the quality of life declined, 
officials used the exact health concerns that initial demolitions had 
caused to explain why more removals were necessary.396 
Countless Rio de Janeiro favelas faced systemic evictions at the 
hands of the Brazilian government after centuries of low public 
investment in infrastructure, and of the failure to recognize property 
titles.397 Even those families that consented to relocation to other areas 
based on Rio officials’ promise of an improvement in their difficult 
living conditions experienced violations of their rights along the way.398 
Residents were frequently coerced and threatened by Rio de Janeiro 
officials to intimidate the residents into consenting to a meager 
relocation package.399 The minority of residents that were offered any 
reparations whatsoever often were relocated to distant, isolated areas 
with even less access to services and infrastructure than their previous 
land had.400 Those who accepted the government’s offer of resettlement 
received compensation below the market price for their property.401 
Brazil researchers received reports that favela residents who refused to 
accept the meager compensation offers had effectively been forced out 
of their communities after authorities initiated large-scale demolitions 
 
 391 Felicity Clarke, The Never-Ending Eviction: Demolition, Protest and Police Violence Once 
Again Rock Favela do Metrô, RIOONWATCH (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=
12978. 
 392 Id. 
 393 See Douglas, supra note 8. 
 394 See Hodges, supra note 385. 
 395 Id. 
 396 Id. 
 397 See supra Part I. 
 398 See Daibert, supra note 376. 
 399 Ben Tavener, The Olympics Are Screwing Rio de Janeiro’s Poorest Citizens out of Housing, 
VICE NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:40 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/the-olympics-are-screwing-
rio-de-janeiros-poorest-citizens-out-of-housing. 
 400 Daibert, supra note 376. 
 401 Id. 
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of the favela communities, while hundreds of families had yet to be 
relocated or remained.402 
Despite the destruction, hundreds of Favela do Metrô families who 
declined to abandon their livelihoods were left to live in the semi-
demolished structures that remained in the construction’s wake.403 
Other families with no other options remained in the construction site 
for over three years while awaiting the promise of resettlement and 
compensation.404 The City’s complete disregard for the rights of the 
favela residents left countless children, elderly, and pregnant women 
with few options for resettlement.405 
Sporadic destruction and inconsistent construction ensued for 
three years, until Rio de Janeiro police violently evicted those remaining 
in the rubble of Favela do Metrô, with no prospect of compensation or 
resettlement.406 The police gave no justification for the militaristic 
tactics employed to evict the remaining destitute families using rubber 
bullets, pepper spray, and other similar techniques.407 
City authorities predicated the destruction of Favela do Metrô as 
necessary due to its close proximity to the site of the Maracanã 
Stadium.408 The City’s plans for the favela property were never officially 
disclosed, though the construction contracts indicated that the property 
was to be developed into a parking lot and commercial strip for the 
nearby stadium.409 Ultimately, the mass destruction of Favela do Metrô 
under the World Cup agenda was in vain, as neither a parking lot nor 
any redevelopment of the site has occurred.410 As of this writing, 
abandoned construction materials are scattered throughout mountains 
of rubble as the land remains unutilized.411 The chaos and panic 
inflicted under Rio de Janeiro authorities in Favela do Metrô has yet to 
serve any purpose.412 
It is useful to delve into some of the history of Rio de Janeiro’s 
selection as an Olympic and FIFA World Cup site before further 
 
 402 Phillips, supra note 377. 
 403 Id.; Hodges, supra note 385. 
 404 Clarke, supra note 391. 
 405 Phillips, supra note 377. 
 406 Hodges, supra note 385. 
 407 Id. 
 408 See Vinod Sreeharsha, Sporting Events Leave Rio’s Favela Residents Terrified, MIAMI 
HERALD (Dec. 8, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/article4376989.html. 
 409 David Sim, Rio 2016: Favela Residents Refuse to Move out to Make Way for Olympic 
Construction, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015, 10:55 GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/rio-
2016-favela-residents-refuse-move-out-make-way-olympic-construction-photo-report-
1512821. 
 410 Hodges, supra note 385. 
 411 See id. 
 412 Id. 
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examining the consequences of that decision. Initially, the Executive 
Council of the Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) conducted a 
technical analysis to evaluate the conditions of Rio de Janeiro as a viable 
city to host the 2016 Summer Olympics, whose findings were then 
incorporated into the analysis of the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC).413 With the support of the Brazilian government and the Mayor 
of Rio de Janeiro, the BOC nominated the city to host the 2016 Summer 
Olympics.414 
Rio’s bid was considered by the IOC based upon the BOC’s 
application file as well as a technical analysis by the IOC’s Evaluation 
Commission on the City’s potential for staging successful Olympic 
Games.415 In selecting a host city, the Evaluation Commission’s 2016 
report commended Rio’s strong government support, legal backing, and 
public opinion.416 The report outlined Rio de Janeiro’s biggest weakness 
as a potential host city stemming from the recurrent issues of violence 
potentially affecting the security and safety of holding Olympic 
events.417 The IOC’s concern for the safety of the events may have 
encouraged Brazilian officials’ intensive police intrusion into many 
favelas neighboring Rio de Janeiro.418 Despite these security concerns, 
the Brazilian government triumphantly celebrated when the IOC’s 
Evaluation Commission selected Rio de Janeiro as the first city in South 
America to host the Olympic games.419 In preparation for the Olympic 
events, Brazilian officials built and redeveloped many venues to meet 
the demands of holding the festivities, many of which sat empty just 
months later.420 
 
 413 INT’L OLYMPIC COMM. CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE WORKING GRP., GAMES OF THE 
XXXI OLYMPIAD 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT (2008) [hereinafter 2016 OLYMPIAD REPORT], 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host-City-
Elections/XXXI-Olympiad-2016/Working-Group-Report-for-the-Games-of-the-XXXI-
Olympiad-in-2016.pdf. 
 414 Anderson Gomes, COB Lança Candidatura do Rio para Olimpíadas de 2016, UOL 
ESPORTE (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://esporte.uol.com.br/outros/ultimas/2006/09/01/
ult807u851.jhtm. 
 415 2016 OLYMPIAD REPORT, supra note 413. 
 416 Id. at 20. 
 417 Id. at 78. 
 418 See Jonathan Watts, World Cup 2014: Rio’s Favela Pacification Turns into Slick 
Operation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2013, 6:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
oct/07/2014-world-cup-rio-favela-pacification. 
 419 Juliet Macur, Rio Wins 2016 Olympics in a First for South America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03olympics.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 
 420 Nancy Armour, Six Months After Olympics, Rio Is Falling Apart and the IOC Should 
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In 2007, FIFA, the world soccer body, announced that the 2014 
FIFA World Cup tournament would be held in Brazil.421 Upon 
selection, government officials promised to redirect all public resources 
to meet FIFA’s stadium requirements and to develop a city that can 
handle the mass influx of event visitors.422 Brazil’s planning of the 2014 
World Cup was riddled with inefficiency and controversy from the 
initial stage, which served to exacerbate the underlying social and 
economic tensions.423 While awarded the 2014 World Cup in 2007, 
Brazil wasted almost two whole years in designating which cities would 
host the games.424 The vast infrastructure requirements dictated by FIFA 
to the Brazilian authorities prompted the largest public display of anger 
in the country in over twenty years.425 The plans enacted by Brazilian 
officials showed minimal concern for public opinion.426 The priority of 
constructing multi-billion dollar mega stadiums outweighed the need to 
improve the underfunded hospitals and schools of a country replete 
with slums.427 
To construct the necessary facilities, Brazilian officials violated the 
rights of an estimated 250,000 residents by systematically removing 
properties with force. These forced takings had little effect on the elite 
and wealthy.428 The exact count of those displaced is a fleeting 
number.429 The majority of favela residents affected by the takings had 
spent generations maintaining and improving their properties, despite 
having no legal protection to their land.430 
Vila Autódromo, a well-organized favela within the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, has a well-documented history of organization and 
 
 421 Brazil Confirmed as 2014 Hosts, FIFA.COM (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.fifa.com/
worldcup/news/y=2007/m=10/news=brazil-confirmed-2014-hosts-625695.html. 
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10, 2014, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/fifa-s-100-million-
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INST. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/ethical-analysis-of-the-2014-
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Squirm, TIME (June 21, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/06/21/brazils-world-cup-protests-
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 425 Id. 
 426 See id.; see also Anderson Antunes, How the 2014 FIFA World Cup Became the Worst 
Publicity Stunt in History, FORBES (May 27, 2014, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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 427 Downie, supra note 424. 
 428 See id. 
 429 At one point, it was believed that 30,000 people were relocated. Barney Ronay, World 
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development.431 Local fishermen settled Vila Autódromo for its close 
proximity to a nearby lagoon.432 In the following couple of decades, 
construction workers and other local migrants flocked to the expanding 
community.433 Despite the lack of government support, in 1987, the 
community joined together to found an encompassing residents’ 
association to cultivate infrastructure such as water and electricity.434 In 
1992, the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro granted 354 households 
a lease for the land for a thirty-three-year period.435 The granted lease 
was subsequently extended to ninety-nine years in 1994 by the governor 
of Rio de Janeiro.436 By 2005, as an additional security against 
government evictions, Rio de Janeiro officials declared part of Vila 
Autódromo to be a “Special Zone of Social Interest.”437 The formal 
nature of Rio officials’ various recognition of Vila Autódromo as a 
legally occupied community suggests that the community was to be 
protected from government removals. 
However, the safeguards for which these residents fought 
ultimately were obtained in vain because, in 2009, Rio officials began 
discussion of relocating the residents of Vila Autódromo to 
accommodate the necessary Olympic infrastructure.438 Therein, the City 
formally committed to the IOC a plan to connect competition venues 
and existing transportation routes throughout Rio, now known as 
TransOlímpica. The proposed route was designated to cut directly 
through Vila Autódromo, despite countless other video projections 
demonstrating that the planned expansion of travel routes could have 
spared or upgraded the community to comply with the Olympic 
infrastructure needs.439 Fabricio Leal de Oliveira, an urban planning 
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PERU 79, 101 (Veronique Dupont et al. eds., 2016). 
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 439 See Luke Milner, Rio’s Olympic Legacy and Vila Autódromo, RIO TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), 
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professor from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, explained that 
Vila Autódromo had “favorable conditions for upgrading,” unlike the 
challenges many other Rio favelas would present.440 Oliveira went on to 
distinguish Vila Autódromo from the majority of other Rio de Janeiro 
favelas: “Normally favelas are narrower and denser with smaller plots, 
which is much more difficult to upgrade. Here the plots are relatively 
regular. . . . If the City wanted, they’d have urbanized this a long time 
ago.”441 The environmental characteristics of Vila Autódromo are 
consistent with those of the adjacent, upscale neighborhood of Barra da 
Tijuca, with defined roads, plots, and well-built structures.442 Ultimately, 
Rio de Janeiro’s assertion that the demolition of Vila Autódromo was 
necessary to construct the Olympic infrastructure proved deceitful and 
inaccurate.443 
The City’s strong intent to displace Vila Autódromo became 
evident, as resident and activist Jane Nascimento de Oliveira stated that 
she first learned of plans for her community’s removal through a 
television broadcast by Rio’s mayor, Eduardo Paes.444 Paes explained, 
through media proxy, that the land leases to Vila Autódromo instated in 
1994 by former governor Leonel de Moura Brizola were not legally 
recognized under his administration.445 Paes went on to arbitrarily 
denounce the 1994 documents provided to Vila Autódromo residents as 
inconsequential “little [pieces of] paper.”446 Thereafter, the City took 
action to revoke the community’s Special Zone of Social Interest status 
to bolster the logic behind resettlement.447 Rio de Janeiro officials 
explicitly nullified property leases legally issued under a previous City 
administration to ease the City’s ability to satisfy Olympic contracts.448 
In March 2010, in response to the stringent actions taken by 
officials, Vila Autódromo community representatives met with city 
government officials, the state housing secretary, public defenders, and 
activist groups in hopes of conciliation.449 City officials sought to justify 
 
 440 Felicity Clarke, Vila Autódromo Creates Upgrading Plan in Fight Against Olympic 
Eviction, RIOONWATCH (July 26, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=4405. 
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Apresentado, INFRAESTRUTURA (Mar. 31, 2016), http://infraestruturaurbana.pini.com.br/
solucoes-tecnicas/urbanismo/plano-de-urbanizacao-para-a-vila-autodromo-no-rio-de-370049-
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the City’s plan for resettlement by diverting the blame to the IOC, 
suggesting that the IOC designated the demolition of Vila Autódromo 
as necessary.450 City officials continued to justify the demolition of Vila 
Autódromo with various, fluctuating reasons. The City later introduced 
a new rationale, suggesting that safer conditions needed to be secured 
for the new Olympic structures.451 The different safety concerns asserted 
alternated between prioritizing the safety for Vila Autódromo residents, 
and community safety from these same residents.452 City officials argued 
that Vila Autódromo posed an environmental risk and must be 
relocated.453 In response to the inconsistent rationales provided by the 
City, residents and community supporters unified in front of the Rio de 
Janeiro City Hall to ask for both formal documentation and clearer 
description of the presented environmental claims.454 
In October 2011, based on information provided by City officials, 
the Rio newspaper O Globo reported that Vila Autódromo would be 
removed in whole by 2013.455 According to Theresa Williamson,456 the 
City employed a typical method of intimidation by using the local 
newspaper to first announce the plans for forced removals of Vila 
Autódromo, prior to the plans even being finalized.457 Williamson went 
on to specify that residents threatened with relocation had to be offered 
three options by municipal law: monetary compensation, nearby 
housing, or assisted purchase, stipulating that there should be “no 
removal of established communities” unless the area presents a crucial 
risk to the population.458 
The community support of Vila Autódromo, along with strong 
resident activism against city officials, strengthened the community’s 
efforts to fight back.459 Throughout 2012, Vila Autódromo consistently 
unified to combat the power of the City’s redevelopment plans.460 The 
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Vila Autódromo residents’ association organized the community to 
educate residents about their rights and undermine the government’s 
intimidation tactics.461 The turmoil of Vila Autódromo gained national 
attention when activists shot a video filming government officials 
intimidating residents during a “registration for relocation” drive, a 
formal process mandated when people hold legal property claims.462 
The efforts of community activists proved beneficial, as Vila 
Autódromo gained legal advisors and additional resources to fight the 
government’s circumvention of the legal requirements.463 The residents’ 
association collaborated with public defenders to record community 
members who wished to stay in Vila Autódromo by conducting door-
to-door interviews to amass a community census and inform residents 
of their rights.464 The community census confirmed that among the 
approximately 720 families owning homes in the community, well over 
half of the families affirmed their wish to remain.465 This activism 
proved critical as it prevented city officials from being able to argue that 
a majority of Vila Autódromo residents wanted to leave, a standard 
tactic in forced removal regimes. 
B.     To Title or Not to Title? 
The dramatic way in which the Brazilian government has treated 
citizens during removals to make way for facilities for the World Cup 
and Olympics is illustrative of a larger principle, which is that even a 
decently well-functioning informal property system puts politically 
powerless individuals at the mercy of the government’s whims. While 
the absence of title is not the only factor explaining the actions of the 
Brazilian government toward its people, it contributes to the sense that 
favela residents lack legitimacy and are thereby holders of privileges 
rather than of rights. The informal property system allows residents to 
get by on a daily basis and effectuate transfers, but their ability to invest 
in their property and use it as collateral is diminished via the lack of 
title. In his seminal work on the subject, Hernando de Soto argued that 
property rights are a key component to the formation of capital and that 
a titling system is crucial to allow individuals to secure property rights 
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and use land to secure loans.466 Martha Nussbaum went a step further 
and listed “[b]eing able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others” as 
necessary conditions of “a life worthy of human dignity.”467 Indeed, the 
resentment of favela residents at not being treated like the inhabitants of 
the asfalto468 is palpable. 
Rio de Janeiro’s experience with informal property rights shows 
some of the limitations of the type of self-organization described most 
famously in Robert Ellickson’s work, Order Without Law.469 Informal 
property systems have been criticized for a number of reasons over the 
years, including their high propensity for triggering violence.470 
Certainly, the residents’ associations are not models of providers of due 
process, and favela inhabitants lack significant recourse if they feel 
wronged. Title is a prerequisite to accessing the courts both for inter-
resident disputes and, more importantly, when the government seeks to 
dispossess residents.471 Brazil has specific laws in place for the exercise 
of eminent domain on the asfalto. The laws delineate both the 
conditions under which eminent domain can take place—which is only 
in situations where the government can prove public utility or social 
interest—and what constitutes fair compensation.472 The way that favela 
residents can access this compensation as a matter of right is through 
the formalization of ownership, which requires access to the same 
documentation as everyone else, mainly in the form of title.473 
In addition to favela inhabitants’ struggle with the government and 
the cartório system, the residents’ associations have a vested interest in 
 
 466 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
 467 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES 
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 468  
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dichotomy morro/asfalto (hill/asphalt), a signifier everyone understands and uses to 
navigate the complexity of divisions and lines of segregation that characterise Rio.  
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Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59. 
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 472 Lei No. 3.365, de 21 de Junho de 1941, D.O.U. de 18.7.1941. 
 473 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 33–34; see also Douglas, supra 
note 8. 
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keeping individual title out of the hands of the inhabitants. For example, 
the Cada Familia program did not simply fail due to a lack of 
government resources; rather the residents’ associations refused to  
collaborate because it was neither in their financial nor their political 
interest to do so. . . . [D]istribution of property title would have 
eliminated their ability to parcel out new lots in the favela[, and] 
[p]olitically, it would have weakened their role as the intermediary 
between local residents and state power.474  
Nominally, the residents’ associations have at times opposed title due to 
concerns about gentrification.475 Even among those skeptical of the 
importance of individual title, however, some have questioned the level 
of gentrification likely to occur given that  
[e]ven if the head of the household was able to move, it was unlikely 
that he or she was able to afford to buy a space outside the favela that 
was both large enough and close enough to the city to bring the 
extended family along. The cost of such a move would be prohibitive 
or mean giving up work.476  
To the extent that gentrification does occur, it is not all created equal. 
For instance, some studies about gentrification in the United States 
suggest that this effect does not cause widespread displacement and can 
in fact motivate long-term residents to stay because the neighborhood 
becomes more attractive.477 At times, this will also involve the opening 
of businesses that not only further blur the lines between the favelas and 
the asfalto, but also offer employment opportunities for residents. It 
stands to reason that investors in such businesses would find the 
proposition of starting up in a favela more attractive if it came with the 
reliability of title. 
Certainly, at times the sales price increases inherent in 
gentrification478 may prove irresistible to residents pondering letting go 
of their property. It is believed that pacification alone has raised real 
estate prices in the beneficiary favelas by about forty to fifty percent.479 
The greater the price increases, however, the less unreasonable the 
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decision to sell may represent. This may be especially true for specific 
segments of the population. For example, the elderly may no longer 
need to remain located as closely to places of employment and could be 
benefitted by receiving large lump sum payments that allow them to 
retire earlier or under better conditions, albeit in a neighborhood farther 
away from the center. The effects of individual title in Rio de Janeiro will 
have differential consequences just like it does in countries that already 
possess formalized property systems such as the United States. 
It is the case that titling alone does not resolve the problem of 
lagging economic development. One recent empirical study focused on 
Peru questioned de Soto’s conclusions about the use of land title as a 
means to secure property rights, though it appears that part of the 
problem may have consisted of the fact that the titling in question 
lacked appropriate enforcement mechanisms.480 Some have also 
questioned whether Rio de Janeiro’s favela inhabitants are actually 
willing to take the risk of using their homes as collateral given the 
uncertainties inherent in securing steady employment.481 The usefulness 
of title is thus potentially wrapped up in numerous other complications, 
such as the lack of trust in many parts of the Brazilian government and 
the widespread general economic uncertainty from which the country 
suffers. One open question, as mentioned previously, is also to what 
extent favela residents worry that the consequences of owning title will 
involve paying property taxes. Some use the lack of title as a mechanism 
not to pay taxes (whether because they cannot afford them or simply do 
not wish to pay).482 As described, residents would also become subject to 
zoning regulations and building codes after acquiring title.483 Eighty 
percent of the favela residents that scholar Janice Perlman interviewed 
stated that “they would like to have legal ownership of their property but 
only if it did not mean incurring land taxes and service fees—especially 
since they will still be excluded from the respect and urban amenities 
enjoyed by other property owners in the city of Rio.”484 Perlman 
suggests a number of solutions to alleviate this problem, including 
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giving a grace period for property taxes and ensuring that favela 
residents receive the same package of services as the rest of the city.485 
On balance, the problems with lack of title and the current attitude 
of the Brazilian government toward favela residents suggest the need for 
improved mechanisms to obtain the individual title to which the 
residents have a legal right. The first step is the drastic lowering of the 
price and bureaucratic hurdles inherent in regularization. The second is 
a showing on the part of the government that enforcement mechanisms 
will actually accompany the implementation of title. The third is an 
educational campaign, along with potential legal change to ensure that 
the acquisition of title does not come with exorbitant property taxes that 
continue to encourage favela residents to remain in the shadows. 
CONCLUSION 
No one solution will fix Brazil’s many economic, political, and 
social problems. Integrating the vast proportion of the population living 
in the favelas, however, is an important step toward a stabler and better-
functioning society. Awarding title to individuals in the favelas will 
encourage equality between the residents of different parts of Rio de 
Janeiro and may lower some of the resentment that has built over many 
years. It would give the residents access to the courts in the case of 
property disputes. More importantly, it would diminish the 
government’s ability to engage in property takings without disbursing 
appropriate compensation. Rather than being a privilege whose level 
remains at the discretion of the State, compensation would become a 
full-fledged right of favela residents and may disincentivize the 
government from exercising the power of eminent domain unless 
absolutely necessary. The case-by-case political process when it comes 
to removals has already exposed its inability to protect the most 
vulnerable segments of Rio’s society. Awarding title would effectuate in 
law what is already the case de facto: show that favela residents have 
been the long-time owners and stewards of their property. It would 
encourage investments into the bettering of property and enhance the 
sense of security of the populace. And it would help to ensure that more 
than five interlocked rings stand between spending dozens of years in a 
community and being ripped out of it by force. 
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